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THE EMERGING FEDERAL CLASS ACTION 
BRAND 
JOHN C. MASSARO* 
 
Class actions raise a fundamental question about our judicial system.  Is the 
purpose first and foremost to achieve a societally-desired level of law enforcement 
and deterrence, or is the primary goal to foster citizen participation in the resolution 
of private disputes?  This Article provides the first extended analysis of this question 
in light of five recent Supreme Court decisions regarding class actions, the evolution 
of legislative initiatives in the area, and the docket activity in sixteen of the largest 
recent federal securities class actions.  A single conclusion follows:  we are 
witnessing the emergence of a new national “brand” of class action litigation 
grounded in the protection and growth of individual participatory rights. 
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The brand displaces decades of state and lower court experimentation in favor of 
a uniform national standard emphasizing factual specificity, informed choice, and 
citizen participation.  Absent class members will be absent no more with courts more 
often permitting discovery of their circumstances and implementing procedures to 
respect and encourage their informed participation in litigation decisions.  This 
Article explores these and other ways in which the emergence of the federal brand 
has important and previously unexplored implications for the day-to-day conduct of 
class action litigation.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Born of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the modern class action is now in 
middle age.  For four decades state and lower federal courts grappled with 
competing visions of what a class action is, what purposes it serves, and how it will 
interact with its older and more established relatives in the rules of civil procedure.  
That era of unbounded experimentation is over.  In recent years, Congress and the 
Supreme Court have begun to build a national “brand” for class action litigation.  
The foundational values of this structure are the protection and enhancement of 
individual participatory rights.  In the longstanding debate between those who view 
the class action as a means for amalgamating and then resolving many individual 
claims and those who view the device as serving societal purposes that transcend the 
interests of the particular individuals within the class, we at last have a winner. 
While class actions remain an area of national focus and controversy, the victory 
for the forces of individual participatory rights has gone largely unnoticed.  This is 
because the victory has come to us in the disguised form of two large trends marking 
the class action field in recent years.  The first is nationalization.  Building on the 
model developed in the late 1990’s in the context of securities class actions, 
Congress through the 2005 enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) 
and the courts in more recent decisions have moved dramatically toward removal of 
class action practice from the state laboratories of experimentation into the more 
uniform system of the federal courts.  In Part II, after briefly discussing Rule 23, I 
trace the contours of this trend.  
Potentially in tension with this trend is what happens once the cases are in their 
federal fora.  At the district court level, we do not overwhelmingly see so-called 
“activist” judges using Rule 23 to mold society to meet their vision; rather the norm 
is more passive proceedings in which federal judges appear to leave litigants alone to 
reach a consensual result that is presumably in the narrow interests of the private 
parties.  Meanwhile, at the appellate level recent cases arguably have the effect of 
curtailing the circumstances under which Rule 23 can be used as a simple solution to 
national litigation problems.  In Part III, I examine a sample of federal court dockets 
and discuss three cases from the Supreme Court’s 2010-2011 term.  My conclusion 
is that the trend toward nationalization discussed in Part II is coupled with a pattern 
that some might describe as neglecting Rule 23’s potential once the cases are in the 
federal system.   
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What does this mean?  In Part IV, I drill down to the foundational principles that 
underlie these two trends.  My conclusion is that the two trends grow out of one 
fundamental vision of what class actions are and are meant to be—the individual 
participatory rights vision.  Once one accepts this, the facts comprising the two 
trends take on a new light, and we can see what they are really telling us about the 
contours of the developing federal brand of class actions.  The most extreme forms 
of aggregate proof are now foreclosed and other approaches such as the use of 
statistics, presumptions, and expert testimony will require supplementation with 
more fact-bound inquiries.  Absent class members will participate more in the 
litigation and its resolution.  Expect judges to be more involved in setting the 
litigation table by determining at an early stage whether claims have substance 
independent of the rules, selecting class counsel and representatives, and 
determining whether certification is called for and, if so, the specific contours of the 
class.   
Implementing this national branding project will not be easy.  Fostering 
individual participation never is.  Elections can seem crass, time consuming, and 
expensive.  Many do not vote and some that do are uninformed or make choices we 
consider unwise.  It would be easier to choose our officials based on statistically 
valid polls or the advice of experts who are familiar with the issues and the strengths 
and weaknesses of each candidate.  But we do not.  For the elected branches of our 
government, we believe that individual participation produces better substantive 
outcomes and that the participation is valuable, indeed critical, as an end in itself.  
That same participation has historically marked the proceedings in our third branch 
of government where individual litigants are the real players and unelected judges 
play an umpireal role.  After a period of experimentation in which the relative role of 
individual participatory rights was open to question in the class action context, Rule 
23 is now ready to play an important role in fostering individual participation in the 
resolution of large-scale disputes.  
II.  NATIONALIZATION 
A.  Rule 23 
A brief discussion of Rule 23, the federal class action rule, is in order.  While 
originally adopted in 1938, the Rule acquired the essence of its modern form with 
the 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1  In its current 
incarnation, Rule 23 contains two subparts addressing the standards for class 
certification.  All classes must meet the requirements of Rule 23(a).  Rule 23(b) then 
identifies several different kinds of potential classes and elucidates additional 
prerequisites to certification for each different kind of class. 
The general requirements set forth in Rule 23(a) are that:  members of the class 
be sufficiently numerous to render joinder impracticable (the “numerosity” 
requirement);  questions of law or fact be common to the class (the “commonality” 
requirement);  claims or defenses of the representative parties be typical of those of 
                                                          
 
1
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  The general concept of class actions was first codified in 1849 
when several states adopted the Field Code.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14 at 5; CAFA Legislative 
History at 5.  For discussion of the common law origins of the class action see Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of 
Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998). 
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the class as a whole (the “typicality” requirement);  and the class representatives will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (the “adequacy” requirement).   
Under Rule 23(b) there are at least four different kinds of class actions.  Rule 
23(b)(1)(A) class actions occur where prosecuting separate actions would create a 
risk of inconsistent adjudications with respect to individual class members and 
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.  
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions occur where adjudications as to one class member 
may be dispositive of claims of other class members—so-called “limited fund” cases 
are the paradigmatic example.  Rule 23(b)(2) class actions occur where the defendant 
has acted in a manner that applies generally to the class so that declaratory or 
injunctive relief for the whole class is sought.  And Rule 23(b)(3) class actions—
usually for money damages – occur where question of law or fact common to the 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.  
Rule 23 also contains details about the process of certification, selection of lead 
counsel and class representatives, the conduct of the action more generally, and the 
evaluation of settlement by the district judge. 
At least two other frequently-used categorizations of class actions are worthy of 
mention.  First, class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are frequently 
referred to as “mandatory” classes because the Rule does not afford class members 
the opportunity to opt out of such classes;  class actions certified under Rule 
23(b)(3), by contrast, are “voluntary” in the sense that class members may opt out of 
the class and direct their individual claims in whatever manner they choose.  Second, 
voluntary class actions are sometimes themselves sliced into two varieties.  
“Negative value” class actions are those for which the costs of pursuing the typical 
individual claim exceed the expected benefits of the claim – rendering it more 
unlikely that such claims would occur in the absence of class status.  “Positive 
value” class actions, by contrast, are those in which the expected reward from 
individual claims exceeds the expected costs, rendering pursuit of claims on an 
individual basis more likely.   
B.  National Experiment For Securities Class Actions 
One substantial and longstanding area of class action practice is securities law.  
The federal securities laws have been interpreted as contemplating a private right of 
action in a variety of contexts including, for example, when a defendant knowingly 
makes a false or misleading statement which the market relies upon in setting a price 
for secondary transactions between shareholders.2  Because there can be millions of 
shares damaged by the alleged misstatements, each with a damage of only a few 
dollars, many securities actions could not economically be brought at all on an 
individual basis.  Use of Rule 23 solved this problem.     
But it also created problems of its own.  In at least some cases, securities class 
action lawsuits would be filed instantly upon the drop in the price of a company’s 
stock.3  The philosophy was to make the accusation first and then use the discovery 
process to develop any evidence that might exist.4  Counsel who proceeded furthest 
                                                          
 
2
 See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1985). 
 
3
 See S. REP. NO. 104-98, 104th Congress, 1st Sess. 1995, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
679, 683.  
 
4
 Id. at 693. 
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with his case stood the greatest chance of having a claim to any settlement proceeds.  
Class actions, as expected, produced an incentive to litigate; the fear by some, 
however, was that the incentive was too great and that Rule 23 itself did not provide 
sufficient controls on the conduct of the litigation.5 
In response to certain of these concerns, in 1995 Congress passed, and 
subsequently overrode President Clinton’s veto of, the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”).6  The PSLRA reflected an effort to systematize and 
homogenize the experience of federal securities class actions.  Replacing races to the 
courthouse and separate proceedings in multiple jurisdictions, the PSLRA provided 
for a more structured beginning to the litigation.  Following filing of the complaint, 
the plaintiff must publish a “widely circulated” notice and description of the action, 
and solicit interested class members to apply for appointment as lead plaintiff within 
sixty days of the notice.7  The Court must make an early determination regarding 
consolidation of any separately-filed actions and, thereafter, appoint lead plaintiff 
and lead counsel, using statutorily-specified criteria to guide its determination.8  A 
dominant factor in the analysis is the degree of economic interest of the competing 
parties; the greater a plaintiff’s economic interest in the litigation, the more likely 
that plaintiff will be selected as lead plaintiff.9  Rather than individuals, who were 
thought by some to be within the control of the lawyers in the initiation and 
prosecution of the litigation, large institutions such as pension funds are now 
frequently selected as lead plaintiff.   
As a matter of practice, this means that following its appointment, lead plaintiff 
files a consolidated amended complaint which is the true initiation of the litigation.  
The PSLRA made this job more difficult for lead plaintiff.  Notice pleading is ruled 
out; the complaint is subject to dismissal unless it meets a heightened pleading 
standard.  Specifically, the complaint must “specify each statement alleged to have 
been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an 
allegation … is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”10  In any action where 
knowledge or intent is an element, the complaint must also “state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind.”11  Effectively giving this standard real teeth, the PSLRA also imposes a 
discovery stay; in most instances, no discovery is permitted until the court has 
determined on a motion to dismiss that plaintiff’s complaint meets these pleading 
requirements.12 
                                                          
 
5
 See generally id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730. 
 
6
 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2011). 
 
7
 Id. at (a)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
 
8
 Id. at (a)(3)(B). 
 
9
 Id. 
 
10
 Id. at (b)(1). 
 
11
 Id. at (b)(2). 
 
12
 Id. at (b)(3)(B). 
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The PSLRA centralized federal securities class actions in a single forum and 
brought more order to the conduct of the litigation.  Many plaintiffs responded by 
filing actions in state court alleging violations of state securities laws.13  In 1998 
Congress responded by passing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
(“SLUSA”).14  SLUSA effectively preempts state securities laws when it comes to 
“covered class actions.”15  For many securities class actions or other devices 
approximating class actions, federal claims are now the only claims a private party 
has.  Relatedly, SLUSA provides for removal from state court to federal court of 
covered class actions alleging violations of federal law.16  This does not entirely 
remove state courts from the business of adjudicating securities class actions but it 
goes a long way toward that result.   
The before and after comparison is stark.  Before the PSLRA in 1995, for any 
given set of facts allegedly constituting a violation of federal and state securities 
laws, class actions might be filed and proceed for at least some time in multiple 
federal district courts and multiple state courts at once.  Guiding these courts were 
their own individual interpretations of the relevant substantive securities law as well 
as their individual interpretations of Rule 23 or its state analogue.  After SLUSA was 
passed in 1998, we have a centralized system in which state law has been preempted 
for purposes of most securities class actions, and in which all class action litigation 
arising out of any particular alleged violation of the securities laws is conducted 
before a single federal judge, effectively applying a modified version of the federal 
rules of civil procedure governing pleading standards, motions to dismiss, discovery, 
and, of course, the conduct of class litigation.  The practice has been nationalized 
and centralized.  
C.  Broadening The National Experiment  
Soon after passage of the PSLRA, efforts began to enact comparable provisions 
applicable to all class actions.17  After years of wrangling, Congress passed and the 
President signed into law the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).18  CAFA 
contains a class action bill of rights with multiple components including restrictions 
on coupon settlements, guidance regarding the award of fees to class counsel, and a 
requirement that state and federal officials be informed of any proposed class action 
                                                          
 
13
 See S. REP. NO. 105-803 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (accompanying S. 1260, Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, and discussing Report to the President and the 
Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the General Counsel, April 1997 
at 61 and related materials). 
 
14
 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, PUB. L. NO. 105-353 § 2(2)-
(3), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227, Findings. 
 
15
 See id. § 101, 3227-3228. 
 
16
 Id. 
 
17
 As early as October 30, 1997, a Senate Committee convened a hearing on what was 
later introduced as “The Class Action Fairness Act of 1997.”  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 1-2 
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 3-4; Arnold & Porter LLP Legislative History P.L. 
109-2 at 1. 
 
18
 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4; codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d); 28 U.S.C. § 1711;  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b);  28 U.S.C. § 1453;  28 U.S.C. § 1453. 
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settlement prior to final approval in case they wish to weigh-in regarding the 
settlement.19  Congress also directed the Judicial Conference of the United States to 
conduct reviews of class action settlements and attorneys’ fees and present Congress 
with recommendations regarding methods of ensuring that fees are appropriate.20   
The most notable aspect of CAFA involves its expansion of federal court 
jurisdiction.  In the absence of CAFA, a state-law class action generally cannot be 
filed in or removed to federal court unless at least one member of the class has a 
claim exceeding the $75,000 jurisdictional amount requirement and there is complete 
diversity between all named plaintiffs and all defendants.21  Removal requires 
additionally that all defendants consent to removal, that no defendant be a citizen of 
the state in which the action is pending, and that the removing party comply with a 
one year time limitation on removal.22 
For most private party class actions, CAFA changes this.  The amount in 
controversy requirement is now met if the total aggregated amount of all claims 
exceeds $5 million, and minimal diversity—rather than complete diversity—of the 
parties is all that is needed.23  In addition, the requirement that all defendants consent 
to removal has been eliminated as has the prohibition on removal for in-state 
defendants and the absolute one year limitation period.24  In order to ensure that the 
law is implemented regularly and uniformly, CAFA also provides – contrary to prior 
practice – for discretionary appeals within the federal system for orders granting or 
denying remand to state court.25 
The long and short is that CAFA ensures that a large part of the nation’s class 
action practice occurs in federal courts.  CAFA deals purely with the “procedural” 
subject of class actions.  Unlike the PSLRA and SLUSA, it is not limited to any 
particular area of federal law.  Indeed, it is not limited to—or even really about—
federal substantive law at all.  For actions under federal law there was already 
original and removal jurisdiction; CAFA effectively deals with diversity jurisdiction 
and, more bluntly, state law.  It reflects a determination by Congress that private 
class actions seeking damages under state law should in general proceed in the 
federal courts if any party to the litigation would prefer that result. 
                                                          
 
19
 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2011). 
 
20
 Id. 
 
21
 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011);  28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2011).  Shortly after enactment of CAFA, 
the Supreme Court fixed the law on the former point by confirming that supplemental 
jurisdiction existed over other class members’ claims if a single class member satisfied the 
amount in controversy requirement, but only if there is complete diversity.  Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005). 
 
22
 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2011). 
 
23
 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011). 
 
24
 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) (providing original jurisdiction and thereby rendering the in-state 
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) inapplicable); 1446(b) (making clear that prohibition on 
removal more than one year after filing does not apply to class actions); 1453 (consent of all 
defendants not required). 
 
25
 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (replacing, in the class action context, the general prohibition on 
appellate review within the federal system of remand orders as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(d)). 
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D.  Supreme Court Decisions Further Nationalizing Rule 23 
1.  Shady Grove 
Recent court decisions further reflect this nationalizing trend.  In Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,26 the Supreme Court confronted a New York 
statute providing that actions for penalties or statutory damages “may not be 
maintained as a class action.”27  There, Shady Grove filed a punitive class action 
under New York state law alleging that Allstate routinely failed to pay statutory 
interest penalties on overdue amounts insurance benefits.28  The action was a 
diversity suit in federal court.  The district court dismissed because the individual 
claim did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement and no class could be 
maintained due to the New York statutory prohibition on class actions for penalties 
and statutory damages.  The Second Circuit affirmed. 
In reversing, the Supreme Court spoke broadly about the scope of both Rule 23 
and the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”)29 from which that Rule sprang.  According to 
the majority, Rule 23 “creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets 
the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.”30  Reasoned the Court:   
There is no reason . . . to read Rule 23 as addressing only whether claims 
made eligible for class treatment by some other law should be certified as 
class actions.  Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly 
empowers a federal court to certify a class in each and every case where 
the Rule’s criteria are met.  But that is exactly what Rule 23 does . . .31 
A majority of the Court recognized that this broad interpretation of Rule 23 
placed the Rule squarely in conflict with New York’s statute limiting the availability 
of class actions in certain contexts and therefore required an analysis of whether 
Rule 23 was properly authorized under the REA.32  The REA, which authorizes the 
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure subject to Congressional review, 
admonishes that any such rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any existing 
substantive right.”33  Five justices found that Rule 23, broadly interpreted as 
described above, as applied to the New York statute did not abridge, enlarge or 
modify any existing substantive right.34  Noting that “we have rejected every 
                                                          
 
26
 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 
27
 The act provides that, with certain exceptions, “an action to recover a penalty, or 
minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class 
action.”  Id. at 1431 (quoting N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW ANN. § 901(b) (West 2006)). 
 
28
 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.   
 
29
 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). 
 
30
 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; see also id. at 1443 (“Rule 23 unambiguously 
authorizes any plaintiff, in any federal civil proceeding, to maintain a class action if the Rule’s 
prerequisites are met.”) (plurality opinion). 
 
31
 Id. at 1438 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
32
 Id. at 1443. 
 
33
 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
 
34
 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442 (Scalia, J.); accord at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us,”35 Justice Scalia put it 
this way for himself and three of his colleagues: 
A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species), 
merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at 
once, instead of in separate suits.  And like traditional joinder, it leaves 
the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision 
unchanged.36 
To be sure, the Shady Grove court limited its holding in a number of important 
ways.37  However, both the result and the reasoning used to reach that result speak 
volumes about how muscular Rule 23 has become.  The cause of action in Shady 
Grove was state-created, and the remedies in question were products of New York 
statutory law.  Effectively striking a balance between concerns about over-deterrence 
and under-deterrence, the state of New York concluded that these remedies of its 
own creation were properly enforced only in the specific context of individual 
actions and not in the context of class actions.38  Notwithstanding this, New York’s 
determination with regard to the proper scope of its own legislatively-created 
remedies was effectively nullified by Rule 23—a supposedly procedural rule 
adopted by the Supreme Court on the recommendation of an Advisory Committee.39 
The significance of this outcome is further magnified when one considers its 
interplay with CAFA.  Virtually all plaintiffs seeking remedies under the New York 
statute will have the ability to plead their cause of action in such a way as to invoke 
federal jurisdiction under CAFA.  Having done so, those plaintiffs now have the 
power under Shady Grove to avoid New York’s prohibition on class action 
proceedings seeking statutory or punitive remedies.40   
Nor is there any reason to believe that the prerequisites for class action status 
currently contained within Rule 23 play any necessary limiting role.  Based on the 
logic and language of Shady Grove, if the Advisory Committee were to recommend 
                                                          
 
35
 Id. at 1442. 
 
36
 Id. at 1443.  The fifth member of the Shady Grove majority, Justice Stevens, did not join 
in this section of the opinion but reached the same conclusion based on differently worded 
reasoning. See id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring).  In essence, rather than viewing the 
beginning and end of the inquiry to be whether Rule 23 really governs procedure, Justice 
Stevens advocated looking to the state law in question to determine whether it, in context, 
“actually is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or remedies.”  Id. at 1449. 
 
37
 For example, the Court expressly reserved for another day the permissibility of state 
laws that, while allowing an action to proceed as a class action, set a ceiling on damages 
recoverable in a single suit.  Id. at 1439 n.4.   
 
38
 See id. at 1440 (discussing legislative history and purpose of the New York statute). 
 
39
 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Hanna’s Unruly Family: An Opinion for Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 89, 104 (2010) (“The 
federal interest in substantive claim vindication does not extend to causes of action created by 
state law. . . . New York has spoken to limit the ability of plaintiffs to vindicate the rights to 
statutory remedies.  Federal courts sitting in diversity should not be more New Yorker than 
New York.”). 
 
40
 See Patrick Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping:  A Dissent from Shady Grove, 
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 32, 41 (2010). 
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and the Supreme Court were to adopt changes to Rule 23 to eliminate the 
prerequisites to class certification and permit certification in literally every case, the 
New York legislature would still be without power to restrict that outcome in cases 
involving New York statutory remedies.  Indeed, the plurality of four justices whose 
views were voiced by Justice Scalia would seemingly go further and allow Rule 23 
to be amended, in seeming contravention of the REA, so as to abridge, enlarge, or 
modify an existing substantive right so long as the Rule continues to “really regulate 
procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by 
substantive law.”41  
Shady Grove establishes three propositions:  (1) Rule 23 “creates a categorical 
rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as 
a class action”;  (2) Rule 23 does not “abridge, enlarge or modify any existing 
substantive right”;  and (3) as a result of the foregoing, states have limited power to 
regulate the degree of enforcement of their own state-created causes of action and 
remedies through the federal class action mechanism.42  Each of these three 
propositions is in fact subject to serious question.   
As to the first, there is nothing about the text or history of Rule 23 which decrees 
that all causes of action are, by definition, within its ambit in some unalterable way.  
The Rule states that a class action “may” be maintained if criteria are met—not that 
it “shall” be.43  And, as Allstate pointed out, Congress has taken actions similar to 
those taken by the New York legislature without indicating that it believed it was 
altering Rule 23 itself.44  Similarly, with respect to the second proposition 
established by Shady Grove, any outside observer comparing a world with class 
actions to one without them would likely reach the conclusion that the introduction 
of Rule 23 did abridge, enlarge or modify existing substantive rights.  Some of Rule 
23’s greatest supporters cite this as the very reason for their support.  Even the 
plurality opinion effectively agreed that its analysis likely “gives short shrift to th[is] 
statutory text” contained in the REA.45  But that statutory barrier was ignored in 
                                                          
 
41
 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442. 
 
42
 To be sure, lawyers continue to argue about the extent of that state power.  For one 
thing, the question the court reserved, see Shady Grove, supra n. 37, remains one potential 
indirect avenue for attempting to curtail Rule 23.  And, lawyers eager to uphold and rely upon 
the truly extensive patchwork of state laws akin to that involved in Shady Grove have used the 
difference between the approach taken by Justice Stevens in his concurrence, see Shady 
Grove, supra n. 36, and that taken by the plurality to argue that the narrower approach (Justice 
Stevens’ approach) should govern.  Where lower courts have been persuaded on this point, 
they have adopted an interpretation of Rule 23 that does not preempt the state law in question. 
See Jack E. Pace III and Rachel J. Feldman, From Shady to Dark:  One Year Later, Shady 
Grove’s Meaning Remains Unclear, 25 SPG ANTITRUST 75, 75-77 (2011). The long-term 
compatibility of this approach with Shady Grove remains an open question however, in part 
because it likely involves determining that Rule 23 as applied in specific circumstances 
violates the REA, something that, as Justice Scalia pointed out, is unprecedented in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.  See Burbank and Wolff, infra n. 47, (arguing for an approach similar to 
Justice Stevens’ but implicitly acknowledging that the approach is in conflict with the 
direction the Court is taking). 
 
43
 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 
44
 Shady Grove, S.Ct. at 1438; accord at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 
45
 Id. at 1446. 
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favor of “decades-old” practice and decisions upholding the validity of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.46  Finally, as to the third proposition, as discussed below in 
Section II.E, the federalism concerns are worthy of serious consideration at the very 
least.47 
The point here is not to argue against the result or reasoning of Shady Grove.  
But the decision locked in propositions that should have been controversial at best.  
And the propositions, each in their own right and certainly in combination with each 
other, yield a significantly different legal landscape than would be the case if the 
propositions were qualified or rejected in their entirety.48  The case matters.  Yet, the 
decision produced a limited dissent and minimal outcry.49  Federal class actions have 
become so deeply entrenched in the psyche of American lawyers and citizens that it 
is those who seek to stem the increasing use of the device, as the New York 
legislature attempted to do, that bear the burden of persuasion and when, as in Shady 
Grove, their reach is expanded or solidified the event passes largely without remark.   
The bottom line: it is still the case, presumably, that states can choose to 
eliminate causes of action in their entirety or not to create them in the first place; but, 
once a state chooses to create a cause of action or a remedy, it has limited, if any, 
power to restrict any party’s ability to litigate that matter in a federal class action.  
Rule 23—and by extension its creators on the Advisory Committee and United 
States Supreme Court—is firmly in charge of that question. 
2.  Halliburton 
While the muted nature of the disagreement inspired by Shady Grove’s 
seemingly expansive conclusions and reasoning is telling, perhaps more telling still 
was the lack of any discernable reaction to one aspect of the unanimous Court’s 
reasoning this term in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.50  The issue 
before the Court was whether or not plaintiffs in a federal securities fraud action 
must establish loss causation—the revelation of the fraud causing a drop in the price 
of the securities held by plaintiffs—in order to secure class certification.  Nine 
                                                          
 
46
 Id. 
 
47
 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank and Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 67 (2010). 
 
48
 See, e.g., John B Oakley, Illuminating Shady Grove: A General Approach to Resolving 
Erie Problems, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 79, 84-85 (2010) (adopting the more qualified 
approach of permitting states to regulate the degree to which state-created causes of action can 
be brought as class actions where “state practice—the way things are done in state court when 
adjudicating a particular issue—is ‘bound up with’ or ‘an integral part of’ the way in which 
‘state-created rights and obligations’ were defined by state courts. . . .”) (citing Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1958)); Ralph Whitten, Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: Justice Whitten, Nagging in Part and 
Declaring a Pox on All Houses, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 137-39 (2010) (also adopting an 
approach based on Byrd and Burlington Northern). 
 
49
 See Linda Mullenix, Federal Class Actions: A Near-Death Experience in a Shady 
Grove, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 479, 481 (2011) (describing Shady Grove as “a classic 
sleeper case that failed to command the attention of the media and the broader public” but that 
has “provid[ed] law professors with a great teaching case and new generations of law students 
with continued Erie angst.”). 
 
50
 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S.Ct. 2179 (2011).  
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justices agreed that Rule 23 and the federal securities laws impose no such 
requirement.  This result should have surprised no one who practices regularly in the 
area.  The chosen path to this relatively non-controversial result, however, passed 
through treacherous terrain.   
Essential to the reasoning chosen by the Court was a discussion of the so-called 
“fraud-on-the-market” presumption.  That rule—blessed by the Supreme Court for 
the first time in Basic Inc. v. Levinson—51 holds that plaintiffs in a securities fraud 
case do not bear the burden of proving their own individual reliance on the 
misstatement allegedly made by the defendant.52  Rather, reliance is presumed on the 
basis of two other presumptions:  (a) that plaintiffs relied upon the validity of the 
market price for a security; and (b) that the market price reflected the broader 
market’s awareness of and reliance upon the defendant’s misstatement.53  According 
to Halliburton, the basis of Basic was the observation that “requiring proof of 
individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively 
would prevent such plaintiffs from proceeding with a class action, since individual 
issues would overwhelm the common ones.”54  The Basic Court, according to 
Halliburton, was motivated by an effort to alleviate that concern.55  This 
characterization of Basic provided unspoken support for the outcome in Halliburton 
– if the entire premise of Basic was to vindicate the supposed purposes of Rule 23 by 
ensuring that securities class actions are certified more frequently, then requiring 
plaintiffs to prove loss causation in order to secure class certification is in obvious 
tension with that thrust.  A more permissive approach toward class certification – 
such as that adopted by the Court in Halliburton—is more consistent with this policy 
rationale.   
But the policy rationale is persuasive only to one who accepts a particular vision 
of Rule 23.  In both Basic and Halliburton, all parties agreed that the Congressional 
statute and related SEC rule in question require plaintiffs to establish reliance as one 
of the elements of their cause of action.56  Under the policy rationale, however, 
requiring plaintiffs to prove this fact in individual cases would interpose a severe 
impediment to class certification.  According to Halliburton’s own brazen 
admission, the otherwise-applicable requirements for proving an element of the 
cause of action were therefore altered so as to make class actions under Rule 23 
more feasible.  In other words, under this approach, Rule 23 is deemed to stand on 
almost equal footing with the Securities and Exchange Act enacted by Congress and 
the rules implementing that act.  Each informs the other and needs to co-exist with 
the other.  If rigid insistence on adherence to the elements required by Congress 
would tread too heavily into the territory of Rule 23, a compromise must be reached 
and, in this case, perhaps the very elements of the underlying cause of action itself 
must be harmonized with the strictures of Rule 23. 
                                                          
 
51
 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  
 
52
 Id. at 250. 
 
53
 Id. at 243-44. 
 
54
 Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 243 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
55
 Id. 
 
56
 Basic, 485 U.S. at 243; Halliburton, No. 09-1403, at slip op. 4. 
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To be sure, there is good reason to believe that a unanimous Supreme Court 
would not apply the proposition to every case of potential conflict between Rule 23 
and federal or state statutes.57  Yet a unanimous Supreme Court did go out of its way 
to characterize—and then endorse—Basic as establishing essentially that vision of 
Rule 23.  And the Court did so, presumably, because it believed that this policy 
argument enhanced the persuasiveness of its opinion.  
E.  Constitutional Issues 
Nationalization of class action practice raises constitutional concerns.  The 
trendline from the PSLRA to CAFA to Shady Grove and Halliburton illustrates 
several of these concerns.   
First, there is federalism.  What began with the PSLRA as a change in the 
pleading standards and Rule 23 standards as applied to a specific kind of class action 
filed under federal law evolved into SLUSA’s preemption of state law in that same 
substantive area and then, with CAFA, into a provision for federal jurisdiction 
whenever a plaintiff invokes a particular procedural rule—regardless of what 
substantive area of the law is involved.  That Congress would provide federal court 
jurisdiction, and even exclusive federal court jurisdiction, as a way of “protecting” 
its federal legislative schemes in particular areas is a non-controversial core area of 
federal courts practice.58  By contrast, provision of federal jurisdiction whenever a 
party chooses to invoke joinder, for example, or if a party seeks to take more than 
twenty depositions in a case, is more novel.59  Just as federal courts under Erie60 and 
the REA are generally permitted to develop their own procedural rules but must 
observe state substantive law, states have traditionally been given latitude to develop 
their own state court rules of procedure so long as those rules do not impede 
substantive federal rights.  CAFA explicitly threatens this compromise, at least in the 
realm of Rule 23, by curtailing the ability of states to develop their own analogues to 
Rule 23. 
Separate and apart from the presumption that states should be able to develop 
their own procedural law absent some reason to the contrary, there is the limitation 
on federal court adjudication of state substantive law.  Many believe that the 
diversity head of jurisdiction in Article III Section 2 is the most questionable and 
least muscular of the nine heads of jurisdiction.61  A case can be made that, at the 
very least, any granting of jurisdiction under this head must be “necessary and 
proper” to the specific objectives which motivated the inclusion of diversity 
                                                          
 
57
 See discussion of Dukes infra at Part III.B. 
 
58
 Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is one clear example, but by no 
means the only one. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (providing for exclusive jurisdiction with 
respect to certain patent matters). 
 
59
 See, e.g., David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism 
Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1311 (2007); Stephen 
B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary 
View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1516-40 (2008). 
 
60
 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 
61
 See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects 
and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 966 (1979). 
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jurisdiction in the first place and not to some other Article I objective of Congress.62  
In other words, there must be at least some factual findings made by Congress of the 
inability of state courts adequately and fairly to dispose of class action litigation 
before invoking the diversity jurisdiction to create federal jurisdiction over such 
actions based on state law.  It has been suggested that Congress failed to make any 
such finding and that the grounds it did articulate for CAFA were not 
constitutionally adequate.63   
In addition, there must be at least some limit to the extent of diversity 
jurisdiction.  The jurisdictional amount requirement contained in the original 
Judiciary Act of 1789 was in some sense a reflection of the framer’s intent in this 
regard.64  Indeed, the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention determined to ratify the 
Constitution only with the understanding that several additional protections would be 
put in place and among those was a jurisdictional amount requirement for federal 
diversity jurisdiction.65  By essentially doing away with the pre-existing limit, as it 
was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Synder66 and Zahn67 and replacing it with 
an aggregated one, Congress was at least pushing the boundaries of the diversity 
head of jurisdiction. 
Shady Grove and Halliburton reflect a different kind of constitutional concern.  
In each case the Court determined that legislative decisions about the proper 
enforcement level of the law were to be set aside, or at least calibrated, in light of the 
countervailing requirements of Rule 23.  To the degree that Rule 23 is itself a 
legislative enactment, this harmonizing makes good constitutional sense.  But the 
Rule is in fact the product of the REA, which provides for a mechanism whereby an 
Advisory Committee proposes and the Supreme Court adopts the Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  There is no affirmative legislative vote and Presidential signature of the 
Rules;  they become law unless Congress and the President vote to overturn them.  
This mechanism is likely saved from unconstitutionality by the fact that the REA 
itself was properly enacted and by the fact that the REA expressly forbids the Rules 
from impeding or affecting any substantive rights.  But what this means is that any 
attempt to muscularize Rule 23, particularly in the context where the Rule itself is 
then used as a reason why other substantive laws enacted by state legislatures or 
                                                          
 
62
 See generally C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613 
(2004). 
 
63
 See generally C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce 
Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55 EMORY L.J. 487 (2006). But see 
Judith Resnick, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960’s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class 
Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocation, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1929, 1946 (2008). 
 
64
 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79, § 11 (1789). 
 
65
 See In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, 1788 (Feb. 6, 1788), in Jonathan Elliot, 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1827).  
 
66
 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
 
67
 Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
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Congress must bend, is pushing a constitutional separation-of-powers boundary in 
addition to, in the case of Shady Grove, a federalism boundary.68  
Finally, separate and apart from concerns rooted in federalism and separation of 
powers, there are concerns implicit in class actions themselves.  For example, Martin 
Redish has powerfully made the case that by forcing plaintiffs who may not agree 
with the “cause” to be members of a mandatory class, Rule 23(b)(2) may in some 
cases be forced speech or a violation of associational rights under the First 
Amendment.69  There are potential “case or controversy” issues associated with 
settlement classes.70  And there are all the due process issues with which we are 
familiar including issues associated with using aggregate proof against defendants 
and issues associated with binding absent class members to a result in which they 
may not have fully participated.71  The more that class actions are federalized, the 
more federal courts will have to grapple with these concerns.  The nationalization 
trend therefore exacerbates some of the constitutional problems associated with class 
actions in general. 
None of this is to say that CAFA, Shady Grove, or Halliburton are 
unconstitutional.  Rather, I have in mind the more humble proposition that we should 
recognize that nationalization comes at a price.  These decisions push the federal 
courts closer to the outer edges of their constitutional authority and take authority 
from other branches of the federal government, state governments, and individuals.   
III.  “NEGLECT” 
The fact that there are constitutional costs associated with nationalization raises 
two obvious questions:  what benefits flow from nationalization, and do they exceed 
the costs?  To begin to answer these questions we must examine what is actually 
happening in practice when class actions arrive in the federal courts.   
A.  Practice In U.S. District Courts 
If our story begins with Congress and the Supreme Court moving aggressively to 
nationalize significant portions of class action practice and increase the reach of Rule 
23, there is a plot twist when it comes to United States district courts—the reality on 
the ground appears to reflect a far less aggressive posture toward the expansion of 
Rule 23.  A review of major federal securities class actions supports this general 
impression.  In many ways, Congressional efforts to reform and federalize securities 
litigation in the mid-1990’s served as an experimental precursor to recent 
federalization of class action practice more generally as seen in statutes such as 
CAFA and decisions such as Shady Grove.  It makes sense, then, to check in on 
federal securities class actions and see what the federalization there has produced.    
                                                          
 
68
 See, e.g., Burbank and Wolff, supra note 47, at 67 (proposing a framework in which 
federal courts sitting in diversity must attempt to divine the intent of state’s with regard to the 
advisability of aggregate litigation in any particular context). 
 
69
 MARTIN REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 159-62 (2009). 
 
70
 Id. at 206. 
 
71
 The Supreme Court has addressed some of these issues in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) and Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
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I identified the twenty largest securities class action settlements of 2010.72  The 
smallest of these settlements involved payment of $29 million in discharge of 
“plaintiffs’ style” damages claims of more than $7.3 billion.73  The largest involved a 
settlement of $624 million and plaintiffs’ style damages claims of more than $19.3 
billion.74  The total settlement dollars in all twenty cases were just below $2.5 billion 
and the total plaintiffs style damages sought was roughly $167 billion.75 On average, 
the settlements across these twenty cases were $124 million per case.  If the federal 
courts are actively pushing for expansion of Rule 23, one would expect to see at least 
some evidence of that in the actions producing the largest plaintiffs payouts and 
involving the highest stakes.   
A review of dockets associated with sixteen of these cases76 provides some 
insight into how the cases proceeded and the role played by the various 
participants.77  These are all cases with final settlement approval occurring in 2010.  
The median filing date for the claims falls in the third quarter of 2006, reflecting a 
median case length of approximately four years.78  During that time, there were a 
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 John C. Massaro, Top 20 Post-Reform Act Securities Class Action Settlements With 
Settlement Hearing Dates in 2010 (2011) (unpublished listing and calculation of plaintiffs’ 
style damages) (on file with author). The list includes the largest reported dollar amount of 
settlements for cases in which a settlement approval hearing date occurred during 2010. The 
cases involved, in descending order, are the securities of: (1) Countrywide Financial Corp.; (2) 
Refco, Inc.; (3) Comverse Technology, Inc.; (4) Maxim Integrated Products, Inc.; (5) Juniper 
Networks, Inc.; (6) Broadcom Corp.; (7) New Century Financial Corp.; (8) American 
International Group, Inc.; (9) International Rectifier Corp.; (10) MoneyGram International, 
Inc.; (11) TyCom, Ltd.; (12) Flowserve Corp.; (13) Calpine Corporation; (14) Sequenom, Inc.; 
(15) Dell, Inc.; (16) American Home Mortgage Investment Corp.; (17) The PMI Group, Inc.; 
(18) UTStarcom, Inc.; (19) Question Software, Inc.; and (20) Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. I am 
indebted to Cornerstone Research for its assistance. 
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 Id. (Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. litigation). 
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 Id. (Countrywide Financial Corp. litigation). 
 
75
 See id.  
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 See id. For purposes of the remaining discussion, I omitted 4 of the 20 cases – 
Countrywide Financial Corp., Refco, Inc., Broadcom Corp., and Calpine Corporation. I 
omitted the first two because of their disproportionate size and, in the case of Refco relatively 
rapid timing.  I omitted Broadcom because it combined both a federal securities action and a 
state-law-based derivative action and, in the unique situation of that case, the derivative action 
appeared to occupy a substantial portion of the judicial attention on the matter. I omitted 
Calpine because it was a federal securities action proceeding in state court. 
 
77
 It is not always the case that all judicial activity is reflected on the docket but most is.  
In addition, I note by way of caveat that my review consisted of one docket per case.  Where 
multiple actions are filed and then consolidated, there may be multiple dockets for some part 
or all of the case and my review focused on the docket for the case that appeared to have 
produced the settlement figure.   
 
78
 The dockets reflect that five cases were filed in 2003 or 2004; seven in 2006 or 2007; 
and four in 2008 or 2009.  In one instance, TyCom, Ltd., the case was filed in July 2003 but 
transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (“JPMDL”) to a United States 
district court in New Hampshire for five years before returning.  In another occurrence, 
American Home Mortgage Investment Corp., the case was received in the docket court in 
December 2007 following referral from the JPMDL. 
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limited number of decisions on contested discovery motions in each case and, of 
those decisions, the vast majority involved a magistrate or special master and not an 
Article III federal judge.   
When it comes to what some would characterize as more important decisions 
about the overall direction of the litigation, the story is similar.  Over the sixteen 
cases, there were forty-eight such decisions or an average of three per case.  The 
distribution reveals that four of the cases had four or more such decisions; nine had 
two or three such decisions;  and the remaining three reflect either zero or one such 
decision.  
The specific topics of the decisions are of some interest.  In the bulk of the cases 
there was a contested motion to dismiss and, sometimes following partial success on 
the motion and filing of an amended complaint, a second or even third motion to 
dismiss.  Of the forty-eight decisions identified, twenty address motions to dismiss.79  
The next highest category of decision—with twelve instances—is the related topics 
of lead plaintiffs, lead counsel, and consolidation.80  The remaining categories 
included class certification (six);  summary judgment (two);  intervention (two); and, 
with one occasion each, requests involving amendment of the complaint, striking 
allegations in the answer, lifting of the discovery stay, imposing a stay on the case, 
approving the settlement approval.    
Each case of course has its own storyline beneath what the docket indicates.  But 
review of the dockets is striking in what it reveals about the commonality among 
cases.  With small variations, they follow a consistent pattern of judicial decisions on 
contested motions:  selection of lead plaintiff and approval of its chosen counsel, 
ruling on motions to dismiss, approval of the proposed class, and approval of 
settlement.  To be sure, there is ample additional judicial activity, but much of this 
consists of making the trains run on time—approving stipulations among the parties 
regarding schedule, holding status hearings, and the like.  We do not see in these 
class action dockets federal judges leaping into the limelight as the star of the show 
in the way that the legendary activist judge is said to have done. 
What does this tell us about the effect of nationalization on this area of class 
action practice?  For one thing, the common and regular pattern that the cases follow 
is in fact one of the intended effects of the nationalization.  Rather than a frenzy of 
multiple counsel pushing forward cases in multiple fora, presenting federal judges 
with decisions to make on both the merits and the procedure of the cases, we see a 
situation in which order prevails.  The cases are not in fact proceeding to the merits 
until after a somewhat lengthy period comprised of notice of the action, application 
for lead plaintiff and lead counsel status, and consolidation of all pending federal 
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 Frequently, different defendants raise the same or similar grounds in multiple motions 
to dismiss, but the decision as to those motions is usually reflected in a single order. I have 
counted multiple motions to dismiss as a single motion for these purposes. The litigation in 
UTStarcom, Inc. produced the largest number of motions to dismiss: three.  In New Century 
Financial Corp., International Rectifier Corp., the PMI Group, Quest Software, Inc., and 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., two motions to dismiss were filed for each case, respectively. 
However, in Comverse Technology, Inc., Maxim Integrated Products, Inc., Juniper Networks, 
Inc., American International Group, Inc., MoneyGram International, Inc., Flowerserve Corp., 
and Dell, Inc. there was only one motion to dismiss to be had.  
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 Courts frequently resolve each of these related items in a single decision or order and I 
have counted these as a single decision regardless of whether they are reflected in multiple 
related docket entries. 
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securities proceedings.  All parties know ahead of time that this process will occur 
and the result is fewer attempts by the parties to gain an advantage by inviting 
federal judges to wade into the merits or permit discovery at an earlier stage.   
Relatedly, we also see that the bulk of the judge’s substantive decision-making 
on contested motions occurs at the very outset of the case.  Thirty-three of the forty-
eight decisions occurred with respect to either the lead counsel/lead 
plaintiff/consolidation issue or on motions to dismiss.  This is no accident; as we 
have seen, the PSLRA expressly provided that cases generally would not proceed 
further until these issues were ruled upon—injecting the judge into the process early 
on to set the tone for the case.  Even in cases that survive a motion to dismiss, this 
investment of judicial resources at the front end is by far the largest role that the 
judge plays. 
What’s more, the nature and extent of that investment is constrained by the 
statutory scheme and the resulting choices of the parties.  For example, federal 
judges are less involved in selection of lead plaintiff and lead counsel than might 
have been suspected.  To a certain extent, the provisions of the PSLRA have been 
interpreted as dictating in most instances that the plaintiff with the largest financial 
interest should be lead plaintiff.81  This means that many class members “self 
censor” and do not even attempt to be lead plaintiff.  Others file motions but 
withdraw them once it is apparent that motions filed by other potential lead plaintiffs 
reveal a greater economic interest.  Less frequently than we might have expected to 
we see federal judges deciding competing motions for lead plaintiff status and, even 
then, the choice the judge faces is frequently limited to two or three potential 
candidates.  The choice becomes more limited still when it comes to lead counsel.  In 
only one of the cases identified did the judge deny to a lead plaintiff its choice of 
lead counsel.82  For the most part, if a plaintiff’s firm can bring the largest plaintiff to 
the courthouse, that plaintiff will be chosen as lead plaintiff and the counsel will be 
selected as lead counsel. 
Notably, few of these litigants were prepared to undertake the risks associated 
with greater judicial involvement.  Take the class certification decision—
commentators and appellate judicial decisions properly focus on this issue as 
controversial, important, and fraught with meaning for the litigants and society at 
large.  But, in the sixteen cases, contested class certification decisions occurred only 
half a dozen times; in the other ten cases, the class was ultimately certified as a 
settlement class presented to the court by consent of the parties.83  What’s more, in 
the six matters where class certification was contested, there was no significant 
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 The reasons for this are many and have been collected well in a pre-PSLRA paper by 
Elliot Weiss and Professor John Beckerman. See generally Elliot J. Weiss & John S. 
Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce 
Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995). 
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 This occurred in the Broadcom Corp. case, supra note 72. 
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 According to the dockets reviewed, a ruling on a contested class certification motion 
occurred in the cases involving Juniper Networks, Inc., Flowserve Corp., UTStarcom, Inc., 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., American International Group, Inc., and Quest, supra note 72.  
No such ruling occurred in the cases involving Comverse Technology, Inc., American Home 
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parsing of the choices presented by the parties but instead adoption of the class as 
proposed.    
Even more extreme is the situation with respect to summary judgment.  This is 
the moment when society—in the person of the judge—steps into the case to make 
sure that there really is factual support for the allegations made by the parties.  The 
case is stripped down or molded to reflect only those issues as to which genuine 
factual dispute exists.  But this theoretical possibility is not always met with a true 
moment in the limelight for the judge.  In our set of sixteen cases, for example, only 
two parties—one defendant and one plaintiff—were bold enough to file and await 
decision on a motion for summary judgment.84   
The final phase of the case is settlement.  Here too, the dockets reveal less 
judicial involvement than non-practitioners might expect.  The dockets reveal few 
objectors and experience suggests that the practical remedy for objectors turns out to 
be the ability to opt out rather than to de-rail or alter the settlement.  There is a 
fairness hearing with regard to the settlement, but the parties cooperate closely 
together in the submission of materials relating to that hearing.  In only two cases of 
the sixteen reviewed did the judge take a procedural path different from that 
suggested by the parties—in the first, the judge requested additional assurance from 
the parties regarding the fairness and non-collusive nature of the settlement before 
ultimately approving it; in the second the judge insisted upon deciding the 
previously-contested litigation class certification motion rather than the then-
uncontested request for certification of a settlement class.85    
In sum, the docket study of the most significant federal securities class actions 
reveals federal judges playing a less aggressive role than might be suggested by 
consideration of the nationalization trend alone.  Judges make early “table setting” 
decisions regarding case consolidation, lead plaintiff status, and lead counsel status, 
and they serve a gatekeeping role by evaluating motions to dismiss at an early stage, 
but less often is there occasion for them to rule upon contested motions for class 
certification, summary judgment, or settlement.   
B.  Trilogy Of Recent Class Action Decisions 
The complications to the nationalization model continue when one takes into 
account some of the other decisions by the Supreme Court last term.  According to 
the popular press, many informed commentators, and selected members of Congress, 
the Court in 2011 dramatically curtailed the reach of Rule 23, seemingly in 
contradiction to the steady increase in its applicability as described in Section II.86  
Thus, for example, in its highly-anticipated Wal-Mart v. Dukes opinion, the Supreme 
Court reversed certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of a class of roughly 1.5 million 
current and former female Wal-Mart employees who alleged employment 
discrimination and sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as backpay.87  
Nine justices agreed that a claim for individualized monetary relief such as the 
backpay request could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which deals on its face 
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only with injunctions and declaratory relief.88  A majority of the Court went 
further—holding that certification under any portion of Rule 23 would not be 
appropriate because plaintiffs failed to meet Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality 
requirement applicable as a threshold matter to all purported class actions.89  While 
many courts had previously applied the commonality requirement in a pro forma 
manner—deeming it satisfied if there was any issue common to the class, no matter 
how trivial that issue might be—the Court determined that the test has real muscle 
and requires that the common issue “must be of such a nature that . . . determination 
of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of 
the claims in one stroke.”90  Applying that test, the Court found the class claims 
lacking in numerous respects.  In both its articulation of the test and its application, 
the Court sent a signal that class actions of all kinds—not simply those under Rule 
23(b)(3) with its predominance requirement—must meet a standard akin to the 
predominance requirement if they are to proceed.  Class certification will likely be 
more difficult to obtain as a result of Dukes, and certification of large, statistics-
driven classes will likely face more of an uphill battle. 
Consider too the controversial decision in AT&T v. Concepcion.91  There 
AT&T’s contracts with its cell-phone customers required arbitration of all disputes 
and also provided that any claims be brought in the parties’ “individual capacity, and 
not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative 
proceeding.”92  The lower court struck down the class-action waiver as 
unconscionable under clearly-established California law.  A 5-4 majority of the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) 
preempted California’s unconscionability doctrine to the extent that that doctrine 
interfered with private parties’ ability to agree to rules governing the fundamental 
nature of their arbitration.93  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied not only on 
the language and history of the FAA but also extensively relied upon what it saw as 
a mismatch between the informal and efficiency-driven attributes of arbitration as 
compared to the formality required in the high-stakes world of class actions.94  The 
practical result, then, is that parties may, at least in some circumstances, “contract 
out” of class actions.  Some predict that the decision—by making arbitration more 
attractive to the corporate defendants who draft contracts of the sort involved in 
Concepcion—will result in far fewer federal class actions as disputes which would 
otherwise have been resolved in that manner move to individual arbitration or are not 
litigated at all.  According to this view, another retreat by the federal courts from 
vindicating the values underlying Rule 23. 
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Finally, there was the far-less-noticed decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp.95  There a 
federal district court overseeing multi-district litigation had denied certification of a 
class of West Virginia residents bringing product liability and other claims under 
West Virginia law in connection with Bayer’s sale of an allegedly hazardous 
prescription drug.  A different plaintiff sought certification in West Virginia state 
court of essentially the same class relating to essentially the same claims.  Bayer 
sought and obtained from the federal district court an order enjoining the parties 
from proceeding with the state court action in light of the prior ruling of the federal 
court.  The question was whether that order passed muster under the re-litigation 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §2283, which permits a federal court 
to enjoin state court litigation of a claim or issue “that previously was presented to 
and decided by the federal court.”96  The Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
Anti-Injunction Act and the considerations of federalism which underlay it barred 
the federal court from enjoining litigation in the state court.97  The Court found that 
West Virginia had previously expressly declared that the “predominance” 
requirement in its equivalent to federal Rule 23(b)(3) is to be interpreted differently 
than the federal rule—making the issue in the two proceedings different and 
rendering the re-litigation exception of the Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable.98  In an 
alternative holding endorsed by all justices except Justice Thomas, the Court 
concluded that the injunction also could not stand because the plaintiff in West 
Virginia state court was not a party to the federal proceeding—after all, no class had 
ever been certified—and could not therefore be bound by results reached in that 
proceeding.99 
Both holdings are significant.  In the first, the Court blessed state courts’ 
development of their own interpretations of state analogues to Rule 23 and made 
clear that, even where a federal court denies class certification in a given case, a state 
court may grant it.  This holding has the potential to counteract the homogenization 
of class action law associated with nationalization.  In the second holding, the Court 
suggested that denials of class certification may not have preclusive effect on other 
members of the putative class in all cases, creating the possibility of different class 
members continually re-litigating the class decision until a favorable result is 
achieved.  The practical impact of both holdings is diminished by CAFA, which had 
not been enacted as of the time of the state-law filing in Smith.100  Nonetheless in a 
possible future world without CAFA, and in the areas of state class action practice 
untouched by CAFA, Smith is important. 
The decisions in Dukes, Concepcion, and Smith in some ways push against the 
trend toward strengthening Rule 23 and the nationalization of class action practice.  
Each decision effectively diminishes the circumstances in which matters will be 
resolved on a class-wide basis under Rule 23, leaving more opportunity for litigation 
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in other non-federal fora.  If Dukes results in fewer large nationwide class-actions, 
the result may well be more classes comprised purely of the citizens of one state—an 
exception to CAFA if other conditions are met—and, as a result, more class actions 
in state court.  If Concepcion means more class action waivers will be effective as 
part of arbitration agreements, the result may well be more frequent resolution in 
arbitration proceedings of issues that would have previously been resolved in a 
federal class action.  If Smith blesses continued state experimentation in the class 
action context, the result will be plaintiffs (as in Smith) and defendants alike 
adopting class action litigation strategies designed to take advantage of those state 
fora where perceived to be advantageous.  In short, the nationalization trend appears 
to be counterbalanced at least in part by a trend some might label as “neglect.” 
IV.  THE FEDERAL BRAND 
At a superficial level what appears to be happening is some form of 
nationalization and neglect.  Congress and the Court have aggressively federalized 
class action practice—at the expense of states’ rights and individual choice—in a 
way that risks stepping across Constitutional lines.  In so doing they are acting on a 
vision of Rule 23 that is quite muscular.  But this situation changes once the cases 
are in the federal courts.  The role of federal judges in managing class actions 
appears passive and the developing law of class actions involves a vision of Rule 23 
as a device that is weaker and less able to resolve real world problems than some 
might have hoped.  Given this seeming ambivalence, one is tempted to ask what 
benefits there are of nationalization that offset the costs.  Why nationalize and then, 
for want of a better word, neglect? 
The answer lies in the longstanding debate between individual rights theorists 
and utilitarians about the fundamental vision underlying class actions.  In essence, 
we have a winner in those debates—the individual rights theory.  There will be more 
tosseling about the margin of victory.  But Congress and the Court have chosen sides 
and are moving to put behind us some of the issues that have bedeviled class action 
scholarship and jurisprudence for decades.   
After briefly describing in Section IV.A the nature of the debate in the class 
action context between individual rights advocates and those more focused on 
society-wide benefits, I assess in Sections IV.B-E the facts that comprise the two 
recent trends we have been discussing in light of this longstanding debate.  As noted, 
a clear pattern emerges.  All of the occurrences that comprise the nationalization and 
neglect trends—Congressional enactments such as the PSLRA, SLUSA and CAFA; 
recent Supreme Court decisions such as Halliburton, Shady Grove, Dukes, 
Concepcion, and Smith;  and the docket activity in securities cases—square up well 
with the individual rights theory and not as well with the competing vision of class 
actions.  Put another way, each of the occurrences that comprise the nationalization 
and neglect trends is a girder in an overall structure designed to protect individual 
participatory rights.   
In addition to telling us something about the individual-rights-based foundation 
of the overall structure, these girders also help outline what the more concrete details 
of the finished structure will look like.  There are four main takeaways at this greater 
level of specificity. 
First, the days of unbounded state experimentation in the class action field are 
over.  As discussed in Section IV.B, the nationalization trend means not simply a set 
of concurrent federal procedural rules but likely a system that replaces state diversity 
with federal uniformity in many important respects.  The federal courts intend to rely 
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upon Rule 23—with the Constitution waiting in the wings as backup—to develop a 
federal common law of class actions that will govern what occurs in federal class 
actions and, likely, will ultimately govern what occurs in class actions in state courts 
as well.  We are headed for a uniform federally-driven brand of class actions, and the 
expressly-stated purpose of this change is heightened protection of individual 
participatory rights.   
Second, as discussed in Section IV.C, the federal brand will generally require 
more individualized discovery and evidence than has been allowed by some courts in 
prior years.  Statistical extrapolation of results from sample trials to the class as a 
whole are out.  To be treated with greater skepticism are presumptions and other 
forms of displacing individualized proof.  Put another way, the most extreme form of 
aggregate proof has been removed from the judicial toolkit and some other forms of 
proof require supplementation with safeguards before they can be employed.  
Factual specificity is the theme of the day. 
Third, we should expect to see procedural and substantive rulings designed to 
ensure greater protection of, and participation in the litigation by, absent class 
members.  This means adopting in the overall class action context some of the 
reforms that the PSLRA implemented in the specific area of federal securities class 
actions.  These include publication of the opportunity to be lead plaintiff, front-
loading of the lead counsel and lead plaintiff determination, and heightened class 
communication particularly with respect to the topic of class membership.  I discuss 
these points in Section IV.D. 
Finally, in Section IV.E, I address the implications of these changes for the roles 
of the parties and the judge.  In short, these changes will require more work as 
parties are forced away from litigation based on theories and “checking the box” 
toward the resolution of disputes by more informed and knowing participants based 
on actual facts.  The results of this work will be a third branch of government that is 
infused with more citizen participation and that operates closer to its 
constitutionally-envisioned function of resolving inter-party disputes as opposed to 
broader societal problems.  As our moms might say, the extra work will be good for 
all of us, litigants and courts alike. 
A.  Two Models 
A key debate in political philosophy is between advocates of individual rights 
and utilitarians.101  In the class action context this battle takes many forms, but the 
fundamental dichotomy is between those who view the class action as a means for 
amalgamating and then resolving scores of individual claims and those who view the 
device as serving societal purposes that transcend the interests of any given 
individual within the class.  Is the class action an example of super joinder of many 
private claims or is it public litigation with a quasi-legislative character? 
There are compelling reasons to adopt either view.  Relatedly, there is a sense in 
which this characterization of the debate is over-simplified—we may choose to 
integrate both kinds of concerns into class action practice in greater or lesser 
degrees.102  But at a fundamental level the class action must be one or the other—
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either the class is an entity with vitality independent of its individual participants or 
it is a convenient way of dealing with multiple individual claims.  And that choice 
has consequences.   
Take the subject of opt out rights.  Mandatory class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) 
and (b)(2) do not currently provide for such rights.  The utilitarian views these types 
of class actions as designed to solve a societal problem—how should a particular 
asset be divided or how should a particular defendant be ordered to act in the 
future.103  If individuals are permitted to opt out and pursue individual claims, they 
could scuttle the whole enterprise—obtaining results that require a division of the 
assets that is inconsistent with the class result or obtaining an injunction requiring a 
defendant to act in a way that contradicts what the class injunction provides.  There 
is no reason for such individual rights to be respected in the utilitarian view, and 
there is good reason to disregard them. 
The same holds in the context of Rule 23(b)(3).  If one adopts the utilitarian 
view, there is no reason to give individual plaintiffs any rights in a negative value 
class action under Rule 23(b)(3).  Because the claims have negative value, they 
would not exist at all in an individual form.  It is only by virtue of the class action 
device that they exist at all.  And, presumably therefore, it is only in order to serve 
broader societal purposes that they exist.104  Notice to absent class members and 
opportunity for them to opt out would be of little value to those with this view.  At 
best, these two steps are costly distractions;  at worst they risk permitting essentially 
disinterested parties to hold-out and obtain for themselves a windfall at the cost of 
potentially de-railing the result that is best for society.   
Even in the context of positive value class actions under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
utilitarian sees little benefit in opt-out rights.  For the most part, all litigation will be 
lawyer driven and the opt-out right is largely symbolic as a practical matter.  To the 
extent that opt outs become significant, they reflect irrational behavior.  It is 
undeniable that by sticking together plaintiffs will achieve for themselves the 
greatest leverage and, thereby, the best overall results.105  Trying to fight better-
resourced defendants on an individual basis simply cedes the advantage to 
defendants.  It also may destroy a plaintiff’s claim.  For example, where a defendant 
is one of three manufacturers of a chemical that is known to have caused the 
plaintiff’s injuries, it may be impossible to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
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that any given defendant caused the injury in any given case; the class action solves 
this problem by permitting statistical methods of proof.106  Given this context, opting 
out is irrational at best and detrimental to society at worst. 
For one with an individual rights approach, however, opt outs are fundamental.  
As a matter of both process and substance, one should not be compelled to be a 
plaintiff in a litigation when one does not want to be.  On the process side, the right 
to participate in the judicial process at the time and in the manner one chooses—just 
like the right to vote or to make ones views known in the legislative process—is a 
fundamental part of our democratic system and the very premise underlying its 
legitimacy.  On the substance side, it is for the individual to decide what outcome he 
or she wants from the litigation.  To say that a person’s choice is “irrational,” as the 
utilitarian does, is really to say one of two things, each of which is unacceptable to 
the believer in individual autonomy:  either the “irrational” person is consciously 
valuing certain variables more highly than the other individuals do, or the 
“irrational” person is incapable of valuing the relevant variables and in need of 
paternalistic protection.  To the individual rights theorist, the first is an example of 
an individual appropriately exercising autonomy and the latter is a premise that is 
inconsistent with autonomy and therefore unacceptable.   
In many ways, this analysis makes the particular kind of class action involved 
irrelevant.  Certainly the full force of this argument applies to all classes under Rule 
23(b)(3)—both positive value and negative value.  It also applies to many classes 
under Rule 23(b)(2).  For example, it may be that a particular individual does not 
believe in the “cause” that motivates a civil rights action under this provision.  
Should that individual, even if a member of the class benefitted by the action, be 
forced to participate in an action with which they do not agree?  The individual 
rights theorist says no.  Rule 23(b)(1) classes are different story.  The individual 
rights theorist would agree that opt-out rights are not appropriate in that case—but 
not because of societal concerns.  Rather, 23(b)(1) classes involve situations where 
the vindication by one individual of her individual rights will have a potentially 
deleterious effect on the vindication of individual rights by other class members.  In 
such a context, a class resolution is appropriate as a way of protecting individual 
rights—not subsuming them.   
This debate between an individual rights vision and a utilitarian one helps bring 
into focus the two broad trends with regard to class actions.  Viewed through this 
prism, recent events point toward a clear winner, as of now, in that age-old debate.107     
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B.  Protecting Against State Intrusion 
If we examine the specific data points making up the pattern we have seen in 
recent years, they first and foremost reflect an effort to create a federal brand for 
litigation of class actions—a brand that focuses on the protection of individual 
participatory rights.  Congressionally-enacted statutes have played a direct role, and 
so too have the courts through the use of Rule 23 to develop what is essentially a 
federal common law of class actions.  At this time the federal brand is available to 
litigants if chosen; but the brand may ultimately become mandatory either because it 
is ruled to be constitutionally-grounded or because state courts effectively adopt it as 
their own.  Either way, the hallmark of the brand is protection of individual 
participatory rights against encroachment by the states—specifically, state efforts to 
achieve their desired level of deterrence through tinkering with the established rules 
governing class actions.   
SLUSA and CAFA are obvious examples.  Congress enacted SLUSA because it 
believed that state courts and state law were interfering with the full realization of 
the individual-oriented procedural reforms it had enacted in the PSLRA.108  And one 
of the expressly-stated premises of CAFA was that federal courts would be more 
inclined than state courts to protect individual participatory rights of absent class 
members and defendants.109 
Shady Grove puts meat on these bones.  The explicit premise of the decision is 
that Rule 23 gives an absolute right to all plaintiffs to bring any action in the form of 
a class action if the criteria of Rule 23 are met.110  Even the state legislature that 
created the substantive cause of action in question is powerless to interfere with that 
right of plaintiffs.  The state legislature may be able to affect the level of deterrence 
by changing the remedies available to class action litigants—Shady Grove left this 
question unresolved – and it can surely still affect the level of deterrence through 
other means such as by revising its substantive law so as to explicitly alter the 
generally applicable elements of the cause of action or by changing the level of 
governmental enforcement.  But the states cannot affect the level of deterrence by 
stripping plaintiffs of their ability to bring a class action in federal court.   
While protecting this “categorical” right found to exist in the express terms of 
Rule 23 is the headline, there is also a related rights-based issue that is of greater 
subtlety and importance.  In complex class actions the parties on both sides are 
sophisticated and the choices they present to the judges are increasingly difficult.  To 
pick one example, in the “olden” days at the turn of the century the battle would 
frequently be fought over whether a state consumer protection statute contained a 
reliance requirement or not.  If it did contain a reliance requirement, this would 
generally redound to the benefit of the party opposing class certification because 
reliance is traditionally viewed as an individualized issue which will differ from case 
to case.  In the face of uncertainty over whether the state statute contained such a 
requirement as one of its elements, federal courts would engage in an extensive 
analysis of state law designed to ferret out how the state’s highest court would 
answer the question if asked or they might even certify the question to the state 
court.   
                                                          
 
108
 See supra Section II. 
 
109
 See supra Section II. 
 
110
 See supra Section II. 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/8
2011] THE EMERGING FEDERAL CLASS ACTION BRAND 671 
 
Today, while these blackletter law questions continue to arise, more likely the 
court confronts a much more nuanced issue.  For example, the issue will not be the 
relatively simple one of whether reliance is an element but rather complex ones such 
as whether plaintiffs’ extensive statistical proof in the form of expert testimony is 
sufficient to establish reliance as a presumptive matter on a class wide basis and, if 
so, whether defendants will have a right to rebut that presumption through means of 
individualized proof.  How does a court answer such a question?  In many ways, 
such questions get to the heart of what the “substantive” state law really means when 
it requires reliance as an element and, in that sense, the question could be said to be 
governed by state law.  Under this vision, the answer to the question of certification 
will essentially be driven by state legislative intent and state common law.111  And, 
those state decisions will frequently have been made by state courts in the context of 
class action litigation filed in state court under state analogues to Rule 23.  We can 
see where this trend line is heading – as a practical matter state court interpretations 
of state law in the context of state analogues to Rule 23 dictate the evolution of 
federal Rule 23 law.  Even with the enactment of CAFA, then, federal courts would 
end up acting essentially like state courts when adjudicating class actions based on 
state law. 
Unlike the factual backdrop of Shady Grove—which involved abolishment of a 
plaintiff’s right to sue on a class-wide basis for certain kinds of statutory 
violations—there is no systematic benefit to either side of “v” in this more subtle 
issue.  It may be that some state courts adopt a view of reliance that is more hostile 
than that of federal courts to statistical proof while others adopt one that is more 
favorable.  It may be, indeed, that state courts experiment with other alternatives—
presumptions and the like—that cannot be said to be categorically more or less 
hostile, but just different.  And that is the point:  there will be differences sprinkled 
throughout the federal system.  Some federal trials will look one way and others will 
look entirely different, and that question will depend not upon the differing factual 
circumstances of the case and not upon the differing philosophies of different 
circuits but upon the differing philosophies of state courts. 
The Shady Grove plurality plants a flag on the opposite terrain.  The decision 
declares Rule 23 to be essentially procedural and therefore within the domain of the 
federal courts under the compromise reflected in Erie and subsequent rules and 
decisions.  By placing Rule 23 beyond the reach of state legislatures and, 
presumably, state courts, Shady Grove attempts to ensure that federal courts will 
more frequently look to federal class action law when determining the sorts of 
questions discussed above—questions that can radically alter the course of the 
litigation and the participatory rights of the parties.  This says scores about how the 
federal courts should confront the critical decisions that must be made in every 
seriously contested class action.  Take our example regarding a plaintiff’s attempt to 
prove reliance based on statistical proof and a defendants’ request for individualized 
discovery in response to that proof.  Rather than attempt to discern what the state 
legislature intended with respect to this specific question when it enacted the 
consumer protection statute or what a state court might do when confronted with this 
question in a case invoking a state analogue to Rule 23, the federal judge is charged 
with answering this question under federal law.  The question boils down to whether 
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Rule 23—not the substantive law in question and not the state analogue to Rule 23—
contemplates this form of proof in this sort of context.  If taken seriously, this 
approach could result in CAFA playing a role much more similar to SLUSA and the 
PSLRA – state law has in some sense been preempted in favor of a uniform federal 
approach. 
And why does Shady Grove do this?  Herein lies a broader lesson.  The fact that 
the question will be governed by Rule 23 does not mean that anything goes.  Rather, 
the court’s construction of Rule 23 must itself be constrained by the REA and the 
Constitution.112  Among other things, Rule 23 cannot be deemed to permit a form of 
proof or foreclose a form of proof where doing so would impede a party’s 
constitutional rights.  The shift to having Rule 23 govern the determination of such 
issues, in other words, is also accompanied by a reminder of the limits on Rule 23 
imposed by other sources of federal law—specifically the REA and the Constitution.  
We can see this at work in Shady Grove.  Keeping intact the individual participatory 
rights that would exist in the context of bi-lateral litigation was the theme of the day.  
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion went so far as to explicitly set forth the 
views of four justices concerning what a class action is (and is not).  In their view: 
A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species), 
merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at 
once, instead of in separate suits.  And like traditional joinder, it leaves 
the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision 
unchanged.113 
There could be no clearer case for the individual rights thesis than this.   
There is a sense in which the logic of Shady Grove is counter-experiential.  Over 
the past decades we have all experienced the truly substantive impact that class 
actions have and we experience them as in many ways transforming the substantive 
rights of the parties.  Insofar as it is read as an explanation of what has in fact 
occurred with respect to class actions in the past, Justice Scalia’s logic would seem 
therefore to rest on an inaccurate premise.   
This is not the way to read the statement, however.  Rather than an empirical 
statement regarding what class actions have been, the statement is likely best read as 
a forward-looking statement about what class actions should be.  Put another way, 
the logic of the plurality opinion is perhaps best read as a reminder of the premises 
which should guide the development of class action law rather than as a statement 
regarding what has in fact occurred up to this point.  In this sense, the statement and 
logic are entirely sound.  It is beyond dispute based on the express terms of the REA 
that Rule 23 passes REA muster—and indeed may pass constitutional muster—only 
to the extent that it is non-substantive and merely procedural.  If the very premise of 
the Rule’s existence is its non-substantive nature, then we must hew to that same line 
in other contexts as well.  We cannot treat the Rule as merely procedural when its 
very existence is assailed as violative of the REA but then insist that the courts “bow 
to reality” and view the Rule as essentially substantive when it comes time for 
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determining who it is—state courts or federal courts—that will determine its scope.  
More to the point, this demand for a consistent vision of what the Rule is says 
something about how the Rule’s scope will be interpreted as well.  If the Rule is to 
be viewed as merely aggregating together multiple claims and not transforming any 
substantive rights, that will in many cases dictate the answer to the question of under 
what circumstances and to what degree aggregate proof can be used and, by 
implication, whether certification can occur at all.  The methods of proof and scope 
of discovery in aggregate litigation can change as compared to bilateral litigation, 
but they cannot change so fundamentally that Rule 23 is said to be impacting the 
parties’ substantive rights.   
In the end, then, Shady Grove reflects three things:  (1) an express protection of 
plaintiff’s participatory rights against explicit encroachment by the states;  (2) an 
implicit declaration that the federal courts will be available, and will develop a 
nationally-applied framework, for the protection of all parties’ participatory rights in 
the class action context; and (3) a reminder that the class action device should not 
generally be used to diminish or alter the rights that the parties would have had in the 
context of bilateral litigation.  Put more simply, Shady Grove and the other recent 
developments reflect the federal courts developing a unified national brand for class 
action litigation grounded in the individual rights tradition. 
C.  Factual Specificity 
Find the facts.  That is the first rule of the litigator.  Arguments that have an 
appeal in the conference room tend to take on a new light in the deposition room.  
Our entire discovery system and our rules of evidence are premised on the notion 
that cases will proceed based on factual specificity.  But these rules have sometimes 
bent when confronted by Rule 23.  Unlike their counterparts in the rest of the 
litigation world, often class actions proceed based entirely on expert testimony or 
other forms of aggregate evidence.  One characteristic of the federal brand is an 
increased emphasis on factual specificity in the class action realm.   
1.  Rejecting Unadulterated Extrapolation 
There is a spectrum of possible proof in class actions.  At the purely utilitarian 
end is a quasi-legislative approach in which the only evidence the trier of fact hears 
is evidence from statistical and other experts and no effort is made to test the 
applicability of the parties’ arguments to any given individual claim.  At the extreme 
other end is a requirement that each claim be proven at exactly the level of 
specificity that it would be if it were a stand-alone claim.  In between are a number 
of possibilities such as:  (1) full-blown individualized trials of the class 
representative’s claims with the results of that trial dictating the results of those of 
the remainder of the class;  (2) full-blown individualized trials of some statistically 
significant sample set of claims and extrapolation of the results of those trials to the 
class as a whole on a pro rata basis; or (3) permitting plaintiff to satisfy its burden 
with respect to the class as a whole through some aggregate means such as statistics 
or presumptions but allowing defendant to offer individualized evidence in rebuttal.  
Many other possibilities exist of course but these give some granularity to the 
discussion for present purposes. 
In Dukes the Court confronted one approach to this issue.  Rather than certify a 
class under Rule 23(b)(3), where the predominance of individualized damages and 
liability determinations might defeat certification, the lower court granted 
certification under Rule (b)(2), which does not contain a predominance requirement.  
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In essence, plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief was treated as the main event and 
their request for monetary relief in the form of backpay was treated as a mere add-on 
which could be handled by means of full-fledged trials of a sample set of class 
members and extrapolation of the liability determinations and monetary results from 
those trials to the class as a whole, with each class member receiving the “average” 
outcome achieved in the sample trials.114  This procedure had previously been 
blessed by the Ninth Circuit.115 
The Court’s unanimous view of this approach was negative.  Even if a 
statistically significant sample of class members could be used to determine the total 
liability of the defendant and thereby achieve the correct level of societal deterrence, 
the averaging of results across class members and the process used to obtain the 
average trampled too heavily on the individual participatory rights of both plaintiffs 
and defendants alike.  Thus, the Court expressed grave concerns, rooted ultimately in 
the constitutional guarantee of due process, that individual plaintiffs would be 
disserved by certification of a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(2) where 
individualized monetary relief was involved: 
[I]ndividualized monetary claims belong in 23(b)(3).  The procedural 
protections attending the (b)(3) class – predominance, superiority, 
mandatory notice and the right to opt out – are missing from (b)(2) . . . 
When a class seeks an indivisible injunction benefitting all its members at 
once, there is no reason to undertake a case-specific inquiry into whether 
class issues predominate or whether class action is a superior method of 
adjudicating the dispute. . . . But with respect to each class member’s 
individualized claim for money, that is not so . . . .  Similarly, (b)(2) does 
not require that class members be given notice and opt-out rights, 
presumably because it is thought (rightly or wrongly) that notice has no 
purpose when the class is mandatory and that depriving people of their 
right to sue in this manner complies with the Due Process Clause.   In the 
context of a class action predominantly for money damages we have held 
that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process. . . . while we have 
never held that to be so where the monetary claims do not predominate, 
the serious possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason not 
to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the monetary claims here.116   
The Court expressed an additional concern that resolution of the backpay issue in 
connection with a Rule 23(b)(2) class might have preclusive effects on a plaintiff’s 
ability later to seek compensatory or other forms of damages.  “That possibility 
underscores the need for plaintiffs with individual monetary claims to decide for 
themselves whether to tie their fates to the class representatives’ or go it alone – a 
choice Rule 23(b)(2) does not ensure that they have.”117 
Equally troubling to the unanimous Court was the impact on defendant’s rights.  
Observing that a defendant in a backpay proceeding has the right to present a 
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statutory defense explaining a non-discriminatory reason for its employment 
decision, the Court found class certification more generally—and the specific 
method of proof that was contemplated to flow from that certification—to be in 
tension with such a right:  
The Court of Appeals believed that it was possible to replace such 
proceedings [relating to Wal-Mart’s statutory defense] with Trial by 
Formula.  A sample set of the class members would be selected, as to 
whom liability for sex discrimination and the backpay owing as a result 
would be determined in depositions supervised by a master.  The 
percentage of claims determined to be valid would then be applied to the 
entire remaining class, and the number of (presumptively) valid claims 
thus derived would be multiplied by the average backpay award in the 
sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery – without further 
individualized proceedings.  We disapprove that novel project.  Because 
the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to “abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right”, a class cannot be certified on the 
premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses 
to individual claims.118 
By its terms, this concern seemingly applies to all class proceedings—not just those 
under Rule 23(b)(2).   
There has been much hue and cry concerning the differing approaches to 
employment discrimination litigation reflected in the Court’s majority opinion and 
dissent, and the differences are indeed important.  As compared to the dissent, the 
majority’s approach to the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) should lead to 
less frequent use of statistical analysis and will push class action litigation 
incrementally further in the direction of smaller classes and greater emphasis on fact-
specific inquiries.119  That incremental difference between the majority and the 
dissent is an important part of Dukes and a part that is fully consistent with the 
federal brand.  But less observed—and arguably more important still—is the holding 
agreed to by all justices and the unanimously-endorsed grounds articulated for that 
holding.  These include the express holding that Rule 23 requires notice and opt out 
rights for absent class members whenever individualized damages are sought;  the 
“serious possibility” that the due process clause confers these rights when 
individualized issues of any kind exist; the fact that Rule 23 may not deprive 
defendants of their right to individualized determination of any defenses they may 
have because to do so would move Rule 23 into territory forbidden by the REA; and 
the condemnation of Trial by Formula.   
The problem raised by the lower court’s embrace of Trial By Formula in Dukes 
differs only in degree from that in any class action.  On the plaintiffs’ side, virtually 
every decision class counsel makes will benefit some part of the class at the expense 
of another.  An example seemingly less extreme than the averaging approach in 
Dukes is a damages theory in a conventional securities case.  The fundamental thrust 
of the case is an allegation that defendant was aware of, but omitted to disclose, 
information about the company’s risk profile until the truth came to light, causing a 
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drop in the stock price.  Assume a fixed overall damages number derived by 
multiplying the residual decline in the company’s share price following the 
revelation of the truth by the number of shares estimated to be damaged.  The 
question then becomes how to divide up that pie among the class.  There are at least 
two axes to consider:  the knowledge of the defendant who withheld the information, 
and the knowledge of the market which failed to reflect the information in the price 
of the security to the degree it was unaware of the information.  As to the first, there 
will rarely be a specific piece of information that was known by the company but 
withheld as of a specific date; rather, the information will relate to a risk which 
became increasingly great and more apparent to different levels of the company over 
time.  On the other axis is the investment community’s knowledge as reflected in the 
stock price—that community’s awareness of the risk will change over time.  The 
damage for each individual class member, therefore, will differ depending upon the 
degree of mismatch between company information and publicly-reflected 
information at the particular moment that individual purchased the shares.   
With this background, it becomes obvious that whatever theory of the case 
plaintiffs’ counsel chooses, there will be great impacts on the distribution of share 
price inflation throughout the class period.  The more counsel chooses to emphasize 
one piece of evidence at one particular time as an important fact, presumably 
heightening the gap between company knowledge and public knowledge as of that 
moment, the more other moments in time recede in their importance, thereby 
diminishing the damages claim of those who purchased shares at that time.  When 
class counsel chooses to fight about production of some documents and not others, to 
pursue some avenues of inquiry and not others, and to emphasize some pieces of 
evidence and not others, counsel is making choices about what that damages model 
will ultimately look like and how class counsel will distribute the aggregate damages 
claim among counsel’s many different clients.  This is just one example and an 
oversimplified one at that.  Literally every day, class counsel must make strategic 
decisions that will serve some members of the class and, on a relative basis, disserve 
others.   
To be clear, this problem is not unique to class counsel in aggregate litigation.  
The defense counsel in that same litigation will have decisions to make about what 
serves the interests of the corporation and what does not.  And, indeed, lawyers on 
both sides in bilateral litigation confront these difficulties as well.  Simply put, in the 
litigation environment, it is difficult to know what is in the interests of even one 
client; that is what makes the practice of law an art and not a science.  But making 
the lawyer serve the interests of thousands, or millions, of clients unquestionably 
renders this job more daunting.  If one adds to that problem a method of litigating 
the class action that involves purely statistical forms of proof and in which no 
individualized evidence is uncovered, it becomes virtually impossible to imagine that 
the interests of particular clients can be best served by the class lawyer.  The claims 
of some individuals will never be heard by the factfinder and the evidence that is 
heard by the factfinder will be adverse to those claims in the sense that it favors the 
claims of some other individual at the expense of those claims. 
Any form of aggregate proof—not just the Trial By Formula involved in 
Dukes—creates the potential for threats to defendants’ rights as well.  The elaborate 
set of discovery and evidentiary rules under which the American system operates is 
premised on the idea that each side will develop its case against the other side 
through the uncovering of specifics.  Discovery exists both to test the other sides’ 
assertions in the crucible of the real world facts (which always turn out to be a little 
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more nuanced than the assertions would imply) and to develop and reveal lines of 
argumentation that are independent of the assertions made by the other side.  
Aggregate litigation does not in any way diminish plaintiffs’ ability to do these 
things.  But it can threaten the ability of defendants to do so.  The degree to which 
the factual assertions in the class complaint truly apply to each specific individual in 
the class will rarely be known.  Nor will defendants often have an opportunity to 
develop through discovery idiosyncratic defenses arising from the specific 
circumstances of each plaintiff’s situation.120  As a result, left unguarded, the class 
action device can turn into a mechanism for putting a defendant under a microscope 
and then putting that defendant on trial, rather than testing whether a particular 
plaintiff meets the elements of a cause of action and whether defenses to that cause 
of action exist in the context of a particular occurrence. 
A unanimous Supreme Court in Dukes made clear that one particular form of 
aggregate proof presents unacceptable risks to both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
participatory rights.  But the logic of Dukes applies to all situations in which 
individualized proof is completely foreclosed.  Indeed, in its punitive damages 
decisions predating Dukes, the Court has grappled with similar issues and generally 
laid down the principle that traditionally-existent procedural rights of individual 
parties—rights such as the right to discover the facts and present them to the 
factfinder—if altered, can constitute a deprivation of due process.  
As this Court has stated from its first due process cases, traditional 
practice provides a touchstone for constitutional analysis.  Because the 
basic procedural protections of the common law have been regarded as so 
fundamental, very few cases have arisen in which a party has complained 
of their denial.  In fact, most of our due process decisions involve 
arguments that traditional procedures provide too little protection and that 
additional safeguards are necessary to ensure compliance with the 
Constitution.  Nevertheless, there are a handful of cases in which a party 
has been deprived of liberty or property without the safeguards of 
common-law procedure.  When the absent procedures would have 
provided protection against arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this 
Court has not hesitated to find the proceedings violative of due process.121 
In Williams the Court applied this same principle to hold that the due process clause 
forbids imposing punitive damages on the basis of a defendant’s conduct with 
respect to third parties whose particular factual situation was not presented to the 
factfinder and subject to exploration and cross examination.122  Even before Dukes, 
we were beginning to see the lower courts get the message and apply this same logic 
in the specific context of individualized proof with respect to absent class members.  
Thus, statistical models showing that off-label prescriptions increased in significant 
ways that corresponded to the timing of a defendant’s allegedly improper off-label 
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promotions have been held insufficient proof to establish liability for off-label drug 
promotion;  evidence of the specific motivations of particular class members was 
required as well.123  Statistical models could not be a substitute for individualized 
proof from each absent class member in the case of a class action on behalf of 
alleged victims of human rights abuses124 or individuals allegedly suffering increased 
medical costs as a result of alleged misrepresentations by tobacco companies.125  
And, even where statistical proof is deemed sufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden, 
defendants are more frequently being held to be entitled to explore individualized 
defenses with at least a statistically significant set of absent class members.126 
Dukes and other recent decisions and trends teach that class certification may 
proceed but it has to proceed in a way that continues to respect the individual 
participatory rights of class members and defendants.  Aggregate proof may be 
helpful but it cannot be the whole kit and caboodle.  For the benefit of both plaintiffs 
and defendants alike, the federal brand requires some individualized evidence in 
class action litigation.   
2.  Approaching Presumptions With Caution 
The federal brand means the death of Trial By Formula.  And the logic and 
reasoning of Dukes and other cases also suggests that some form of individualized 
discovery and evidence is necessary to protect the rights of plaintiffs and defendants 
alike.  How does this latter proposition square with use of presumptions?  A number 
of lower courts have rejected the use of presumptions; others have permitted them 
but given defendants the right to rebut those presumptions with individualized proof 
if they so choose;  and some have permitted presumptions while insisting that any 
rebuttal of them occur through aggregate, rather than individualized, proof.  It would 
seem clear that this last category is inconsistent with the new federal brand.  But 
what about the first two? 
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It is tempting to turn to Halliburton for an answer but, if we do, we must turn 
with care.  Halliburton reaffirmed the permissibility of using the fraud on the market 
presumption to meet the reliance requirement for most federal securities fraud class 
actions under Rule 10(b).  By its terms, it did so on the basis that it would be 
difficult to achieve class action status if this element of the cause of action were 
strictly enforced.  It would appear that in the context of securities actions Rule 23 
does not simply amalgamate individual claims, in which reliance was previously 
thought to have been a required element, and permit aggregate proof but it may do 
something more “substantive” to the very elements of the claims themselves.  Is this 
an example of societal interest in the proper level of enforcement of the securities 
laws coming into play to diminish or eliminate individual rights?  If so, what are the 
implications of this outside of the securities context for the role of the courts in using 
Rule 23 to obtain societal objectives vis-à-vis the role of the legislature in its 
enactment of substantive law?  In short, Halliburton is consistent with the idea of a 
federal brand, but it would seem at first glance to be endorsing a federal brand based 
on a utilitarian conception rather than an individual rights framework. 
Some deeper digging is required.  A review of the Basic opinion itself, which 
was the topic under discussion in Halliburton, reveals that that ruling was relatively 
humble:  it did not require the fraud-on-the-market presumption but merely stated 
that a lower court’s discretionary decision to adopt the presumption in a particular 
case “is not inappropriate.”127  The Court identified two reasons why such a 
presumption was “not inappropriate”—first, legislative history suggested that “in 
drafting the Act [in question] Congress expressly relied on” the premises underlying 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption; second, the facts—as evidenced by “common 
sense,” “probability,” “recent empirical studies” and the expert opinions of “market 
professionals” and “commentators”—supported the presumption.128  What’s more, 
the decision was at pains to point out that defendants would have some opportunity 
to rebut the presumption.  In this sense, the presumption did not amount to a direct 
morphing of the elements of the cause of action but was more akin to an evidentiary 
ruling, which is of course a more “procedural” determination that is well within the 
province of the courts. 
In practice, of course, the nuanced origins of Basic have not always been 
respected.  If a statement is in fact deemed material in the sense that a reasonable 
investor would want to know the information, there is rarely any effort by defendants 
to demonstrate in a systematic way that—notwithstanding that fact—the reliance 
element is not met as to the class as a whole.  The presumption that material 
information will be relied upon by the market and reflected in the price, which in 
turn is relied upon by the individual investors that comprise the class, frequently 
becomes for all intents and purposes the final word on the matter.  But there is a 
reason for this.  The truth is that the purchase of securities is in fact in most cases a 
purely financial act.  Sophisticated investors drive the market and those investors 
purchase one stock as compared to another because they believe that that stock will 
make them money.  For the most part, they do not make purchases based on 
emotional or individualized anecdotal information.  The evidence suggests that this 
is true and, equally important, the Basic Court concluded that Congress believed this 
to be true when it enacted Rule 10(b).  What this means is that the very element of 
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the claim—reliance—has a different meaning in the context of a Rule 10(b) action 
than it does in, say, a consumer class action.  Congress believed—and it is in fact 
generally true—that if a company’s statement carries with it certain financial 
implications, those financial implications will be relied upon in the sense that they 
will be reflected in the price of the company’s stock. 
A number of courts have taken the wrong lesson from Basic and its progeny.  
Thus, there have been courts which have attempted to apply the fraud on the market 
presumption to other contexts such as consumer class actions involving alleged 
misstatements in connection with the sale of prescription drugs.129  While it is not 
always clear, presumably these courts are acting based on premises similar to those 
which seem at first glance to have been articulated in Halliburton—that the practical 
necessity of making a class action workable should trump the insistence on rigid 
adherence to proving the elements of the cause of action.  But consumers do not 
“rely” on the market in the same way that investors do.  While it is generally fair to 
assume that investors purchase shares based purely on an assessment of the 
monetary value of those shares and that therefore in an efficient market any 
misstatement as to the value impacts the share’s price, it is not as clearly the case 
that consumers purchase products based on a uniformly-applicable financial 
assessment of the product’s worth.  Products may be worth one thing to one person 
and something different to another person.  They may be purchased for emotional 
reasons or for multiple different “logical” reasons and uses.  A representation 
relating to one aspect of the product, then, does not automatically affect the price.  
More important, if it does affect the price, it does not necessarily do so as a result of 
reliance by individual market participants that is uniform across the class.  To prove 
reliance, in short, there is an argument to be made that it is not enough to prove that 
some purchaser of the product would want to know the information because it is 
relevant to the inherent value of the product; one must instead establish that 
consumers were in fact exposed to the statement and did in fact make their purchases 
based on that statement.   
The point is not to argue for or against expansion of the Basic presumption in 
particular cases.  It is rather to emphasize that there is a difference between the two 
situations.  Congress’ judgment, as reflected in the legislative history relied upon by 
Basic, that there was factual cause for a presumption of reliance in the case of the 
securities laws does not automatically mean that every time the element of reliance is 
used in a statute or by a court that it has that same meaning.  Not all reliance 
elements are equal.  And it is up to the federal courts, using the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation and common law exposition, to figure out what form of 
reliance was intended to be an element of the particular claims before them.  The 
lesson of Basic is not that courts are free to ignore a defendant’s right to insist upon 
proof of all elements of a cause of action if doing so would be inconvenient or would 
frustrate the ability to certify a class.  Rather, the lesson is that for federal causes of 
action courts must look to what the actual elements of the cause of action are 
because the elements may be more nuanced than they appear at first glance.   
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As I have suggested, courts seeking to expand the Basic presumption outside of 
the securities context are not the only ones to have potentially misread Basic.  
Eschewing any reference to Congressional intent or the factual basis for the fraud-
on-the-market presumption, the Halliburton Court characterized the Basic 
presumption as a practical outgrowth of the requirements of Rule 23.  According to 
Halliburton, the basis of Basic was the observation that “requiring proof of 
individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively 
would prevent such plaintiffs from proceeding with a class action, since individual 
issues would overwhelm the common ones.”130  The Basic Court, according to 
Halliburton, was motivated by an effort to alleviate that concern.131  This 
characterization of Basic is largely incorrect.  The lower court in Basic did recognize 
the practical issues identified by Halliburton and, in discussing the lower court’s 
decision, the Supreme Court identified the concerns.132  But the Court pointedly did 
not rely upon those concerns when reaching its decision.  As noted above, different 
considerations—considerations relating to Congressional intent and the facts—drove 
the decision.  The language in Halliburton is unfortunate, but—given the unique 
context of the securities laws and given the actual language of Basic, which 
Halliburton was purporting to elucidate—it is fair to proceed on the assumption that 
the language did not signal a wholesale departure by the Court from the otherwise-
consistent approach it has taken in recent years to the role of Rule 23 vis-à-vis 
“substantive” law.  Indeed, following the unfortunate language, Halliburton went on 
to emphasize once again that the topic in question was merely a presumption and not 
a substantive determination—suggesting that the Court viewed the issue as 
essentially an evidentiary one. 
Once one focuses upon the issue of presumptions as evidentiary matters, this 
language in Halliburton might be said to be something other than just unfortunate.  
Arguably the language reflects the Court’s view of Halliburton as the federal 
analogue to Shady Grove’s protection of plaintiff’s rights.  As Shady Grove made 
clear, Congress can and does do what the state legislature in Shady Grove was barred 
from doing:  alter Rule 23 by making certain actions exempt from class treatment.  
But, in the absence of Congress having done so, in Halliburton the Court operated 
under the implicit premise that the cause of action is indeed eligible for class 
proceedings and was intended to be by Congress.  The Court was ready to presume 
that plaintiffs’ right to bring the federal action in question in a class form under Rule 
23 should not be narrowed, even if that meant altering the otherwise-applicable 
burden of proof with regard to the elements of the cause of action in order to more 
easily protect and promote that right of plaintiffs.133  In other words, consistent with 
the premise of part IV.B. above, Halliburton and Basic reflect the development of a 
federal common law of Rule 23 in the securities class action context.  That common 
law holds that the practicalities of achieving class certification can be taken into 
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37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
682 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:645 
 
consideration – just not at the level of interpreting the elements of the cause of action 
but, rather, in the more traditional realm of evidentiary presumptions.134   
The distinction is important:  under one framework, the presumption is made at 
the express expense of defendants’ rights in order to achieve broader societal 
objectives in deterrence; in the other framework, the presumption is made in order to 
vindicate the rights of a particular plaintiff and in a way that must be capable of 
being characterized as still preserving defendants’ rights.  To pick one example, a 
court deciding to indulge a presumption under the first framework would 
presumably reject the idea that the defendant is entitled to individualized discovery 
of all—or a statistically significant portion of—class members as something that 
would tend to undermine societal objectives.  A court approaching the situation 
under the latter framework, however, would view such rebuttal rights of defendant as 
essential to preservation of the legitimacy of making the presumption in the first 
place.   
Unlike Trial By Formula, which has now been categorically ruled out as 
inconsistent with the federal brand, presumptions remain in the judicial toolkit to be 
used in appropriate instances.  The unique circumstances of the securities laws are 
one such instance.  Even in that context, however, the Court treaded carefully.  The 
Court made clear that this could be done only in a way that is characterizable as 
evidentiary rather than as a substantive alteration of the parties rights and that the 
defendants need to have an opportunity to rebut the presumption if they choose.  
Other limitations on the presumption inhere in the opinion as well.135  Given the 
qualifications on the Court’s blessing of presumptions in the obvious and traditional 
context of securities class actions and the Court’s insistence that the presumption 
was acceptable only because of defendants’ ability to rebut the presumption, it is fair 
to infer that the federal brand ordinarily will include at least some right to 
individualized discovery and evidence if a presumption is going to be used. 
D.  Informed Choice 
Just as important as the right to participate fully in the proceedings is the right of 
parties not to subsume their individual claims into the collective class, and the 
federal brand takes this right seriously.  For any number of reasons, individuals may 
decide that they do not want the actions of some other party to govern their destiny.  
The federal brand reminds us that class treatment is the departure from our 
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individual rights tradition and that, absent good reason such as arguably exists in the 
mandatory classes, we should give individuals who desire to avoid amalgamation 
every benefit of the doubt.  Further confirming that the individual rights approach 
has won the day, two of the Court’s cases this term drive this point home and go on 
to suggest a future direction for class litigation that involves strengthened procedures 
designed to enhance and respect the exercise of individual choice by absent class 
members, both in the decision whether to join the class and more generally. 
1.  Respecting Class Member Decisions 
Concepcion implicates the right of private parties to opt out of class treatment 
before the trouble even begins and it also teaches us something about participatory 
rights more broadly.  The blackletter holding is that the FAA preempts California’s 
unconscionability doctrine insofar as that doctrine would apply to invalidate a class 
action waiver accompanying an agreement to arbitrate.  To the longstanding rule that 
consumer contracts may require arbitration has now been added the corollary that a 
particular kind of arbitration—class action arbitration—can be foreclosed.  While the 
opinion nominally involved interpretation of the FAA, the Court’s vision of what a 
class action is bears the real load.  In the Court’s view class actions by their very 
nature require a level of expertise in procedure possessed by the federal courts and 
less likely to be possessed by arbitrators.   
The Court expressed concern about the implication of this fact for the rights of 
both plaintiffs and defendants alike.  On the plaintiff’s side, if the class is to serve its 
fundamental purpose of resolving all claims including those of absent class 
members, there will need to be “at least” the same protections afforded in federal 
court, including adequate representation by class representatives, notice to absent 
class members, and opportunity to be heard and to opt-out.136  The Court viewed 
these protections and unnamed others as having real meaning and involving real 
effort and expertise and therefore thought it “odd to think that an arbitrator would be 
entrusted” with the weighty task of implementing them.137  On the defendant’s side, 
the Court expressed concern that the absence of firm evidentiary standards and 
appeal rights, while tolerable in the context of individual claims presenting lower 
risks, would likely become intolerable to many defendants if “damages owed to tens 
of thousands of potential claimants are aggregated and decided at once.”138  
Concepcion, then, reflects the federal branding dynamic in full swing.  Not only is 
there a concern about individual rights that echoes concerns expressed in Dukes, but, 
echoing Shady Grove and CAFA, there is open skepticism about the ability of 
tribunals other than federal courts to adequately protect those rights in the class 
action context.  Put more positively, the federal courts view themselves as in the 
business of creating a structure for the protection of important individual 
participatory rights.  And, portending future strengthening of these protections, the 
Court viewed the implementation of the protections as not merely make-work but 
heavy lifting. 
The victory of the individual participatory rights view and its implication for 
future strengthening of procedural protections of those rights is confirmed by not 
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only what the Concepcion Court said, but also what it did.  The case was about 
whether the parties’ agreement to resolve their dispute without resort to the class 
action device was enforceable or was instead void as against public policy.  The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that California law voided all such agreements as a prima 
facie matter because of a broader societal interest in achieving full law enforcement 
through aggregate litigation.  Concepcion analyzes the reasons why rational parties 
on both sides might agree that aggregate litigation disserves their mutual interests—a 
plaintiff’s desire to achieve early settlement of his individual claim, which might not 
be possible if the defendant knows that class action litigation is inevitable; a 
plaintiff’s desire to control the litigation and participate meaningfully in it, which is 
less likely in the class action context; a defendant’s desire to avoid “bet the 
company” litigation that is not accompanied by meaningful safeguards such as a 
right to appellate review under familiar standards of review; and both parties’ desire 
for quick and efficient litigation.139  In the end, Concepcion rejects California’s effort 
to displace these calculations of private parties about their own interests in favor of 
broader societal concerns about enforcement of the law.  The case presents a direct 
conflict between a utilitarian vision and an individual rights vision, and the latter 
clearly prevails. 
A related point arises when one focuses on only one side of the consent 
discussion—specifically, the consent of Mr. Concepcion himself and, by extension, 
class members more generally.  By analyzing the rationality of the parties’ choices, 
the Court was also implicitly addressing an issue not raised in Concepcion but 
existing in the background and likely to be raised in other cases.  Concepcion 
involved an invalidation of class action waivers on a facial basis as void against 
public policy.  As Justice Thomas points out in his concurring opinion, there was no 
issue raised in Concepcion about duress or, more broadly, the gateway issue of the 
voluntariness of Mr. Concepcion’s agreement.140  The issue of the degree of 
individual choice and informed consent actually involved here is an elephant in the 
room, and it is not surprising that eight justices chose to avoid the topic.  While the 
majority’s analysis of the reasons why plaintiffs might rationally agree to avoid class 
arbitration is sound, our own experiences suggest that even knowledgeable attorneys 
confronted with contracts of adhesion such as the one in Concepcion simply “click 
through” without engaging in any meaningful analysis of the terms and their costs 
and benefits.  Of course, this too reflects an individual choice, but it is one to which 
we are tempted to give less weight.  The majority—with its emphasis on the need to 
respect the autonomous desires of the parties—had good reasons for not opening this 
can of worms. 
But so too did the dissent.  If a fact-specific inquiry into the voluntariness of Mr. 
Concepcion’s decision is called for, that issue cannot be ignored with respect to the 
other putative class members who also agreed to the same contract.  If the battle is 
won, the war may still be lost because the necessity of inquiring into the facts of 
each case likely would render class certification inappropriate or unworkable. 
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The problem is important for present purposes because the contractual provision 
involved in Concepcion and the circumstances of the agreement were not 
substantially different than the circumstances accompanying opt-out decisions in 
active and ongoing class actions.  Like Mr. Concepcion, absent class members 
receive a complicated and lengthy form asking if they would like to participate in a 
class action.  Like Mr. Concepcion, these putative class members are confronted 
with an easy option (simply “do nothing,” as these forms usually put it, and thereby 
put all their rights into the hands of class counsel) and a hard option (return the form 
with an indication that they intend to “opt out” of the class and begin the process of 
obtaining counsel and protecting their individual rights on their own).  Like Mr. 
Concepcion and, presumably, tens of thousands of other customers confronted with 
the same choice, absent class members in federal class actions almost universally 
follow the easy route.  The same dynamic exists not only with regard to the specifics 
of the opt-out decision but all “decisions” that we attribute to the minds of absent 
class members in class action litigation.  As the majority did in Mr. Concepcion’s 
case, clever legal analysts have presented all the reasons why it is rational for absent 
class members to act in this way.  But, if there is question about the adequacy of the 
process by which Mr. Concepcion in fact chose to opt out, those questions are just as 
forcefully applied to the entire process by which we legitimize the constitutionality 
of class actions more generally.  Put more affirmatively, if we are to respect the 
rights of absent class members to “opt in” by doing the easy thing, then we must 
similarly respect the rights of the parties when they have chosen to “opt out” by 
doing the easy thing.  This point in many ways makes Mr. Concepcion’s individual 
situation irrelevant.  Even if he could somehow establish that he did not in fact opt 
out, he would be left representing a class of one—all the others whom he seeks to 
represent have in fact opted out and, in the absence of some contrary indication, we 
must respect that choice on their part.   
Where does this leave us on the consent point?  One reading of Concepcion is 
that it is about requiring consistency in our treatment of individual consent—the 
standards for opting out should be roughly the same as the standards for opting in.  If 
that is so, two distinct paths are possible.  On the one hand the Court may keep the 
“weak” form of consent that absent class members routinely are deemed to have 
exercised in class actions and that now has been confirmed as acceptable for class 
action waivers as well.  On the other hand, and more desirable in my view, the Court 
may develop the federal common law of class actions in a way that requires “strong” 
consent in both contexts.  This means conducting the sort of voluntariness inquiry 
that Justice Thomas alluded to in cases like those of Mr. Concepcion.  But, it also 
means strengthening the degree of absent class member participation and decision-
making in class actions – both respect to the opt out decision and with respect to all 
other important litigation decisions.  The reforms instituted by the PSLRA were 
designed to begin the process of doing this.  One can think of any number of 
additional reforms that would further this goal as well. 
The decision between these two courses may be made easier by the knowledge 
that the impact on the breadth of class actions is likely to be the same no matter 
which route is taken.  If the weak form of consent is allowed, classes will be smaller 
and class actions less frequent because of private party opt outs at the front end.  If 
the strong form of consent is pursued, classes will be smaller and class actions less 
frequent because fewer individuals will include themselves by default at the back 
end.  But the narrowing impact of both approaches on the breadth of class actions 
masks important differences between these two possible future worlds.  In the 
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
686 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:645 
 
former, the fate of individual claims is determined by the bureaucrats who craft 
clever click-through agreements (at the front end) and the class action lawyers who 
craft clever “simply do nothing” opt out forms (at the back end).  In the latter, the 
fate of individual claims is determined by the individuals who hold those claims.  
Thankfully, the Court’s language in Concepcion and the overall thrust of the 
branding project more generally suggest that it is this latter course that we have in 
store. 
2.  Rejecting Virtual Representation 
An important part of respecting individual choice is limiting the circumstances 
under which the choices of others are deemed to be binding on the individual.  Smith 
dealt with this situation in an idiosyncratic context that, because of the passage of 
CAFA, is unlikely to arise with regularity again, but the way in which Smith dealt 
with the issue is telling.   
In the abstract, the issues in Smith were not easy.  The re-litigation exception to 
the Anti-Injunction Act could easily be read to apply to a situation where the only 
difference between the state and federal inquiry was of the minor sort involved in 
Smith.  And the question of the preclusive effect of class certification denials on 
absent “class” members had split the circuits with each side providing persuasive 
arguments for its position.141  But for one operating in the individual rights 
framework the path forward is more clear and, indeed, the unanimous Court did view 
the path as clear. 
As Shady Grove confirmed with respect to Rule 23, the ability to choose to 
proceed on a class basis is itself an individual right worthy of respect and 
consideration.  Smith can be read as making clear that the same holds true with 
regard to rights under state analogues to Rule 23 and that such a right cannot be 
extinguished absent appropriate protections and counterbalancing benefits.  Neither 
was present in Smith.  As to the first, in the Court’s view, there were literally no 
protections afforded to the absent class members—Mr. Smith had no knowledge of 
the federal case and no participation in it.142  Given this, the Court found no support 
in existing preclusion law—developed outside the context of class actions – for 
binding a non-party to a result in which it had no opportunity to participate.143  
Indeed, the Court went further and referenced, but reserved for another day, the 
possibility that absent class members have a constitutional right under the due 
process clause, as elucidated in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,144 to notice and 
opportunity for participation before an adverse class certification decision can have 
preclusive effect.145  As to the second issue, societal benefits to counterbalance the 
intrusion on individual rights, the critical issue is the fact that Rule 23’s requirements 
have been found by a federal court to be lacking.  In such a context, there is not even 
an argument to be made that there is legislative sanction for considering the societal 
benefits associated with class actions and weighing those benefits against the costs to 
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individual rights.  In some sense, the utilitarian side of the cost-benefit scale is empty 
while weighty individual rights occupy the other side of the scale.  The outcome is 
clear. 
The defendants in Smith were not without arguments but none are persuasive 
from an individual rights standpoint.  Clearly there is cost associated with re-
litigating the class certification decision.  But that cost is greatly offset by the 
possibility that a class will in fact be certified.  Put another way, the rationale 
associated with saving costs and achieving final resolution of issues for societal 
benefit is largely a one-way ratchet—if a class is certified, society will save costs 
and achieve finality.  If a class is not certified and that decision is deemed to have 
preclusive effect, in principle the only costs saved are those of the actual motion to 
certify.  In all other respects the costs are heightened as the situation will be no 
different than the one where class actions did not exist at all—the possibility of 
multiple individual trials looms.146  And this minimal savings, if any, will be 
achieved at the expense of individual plaintiff’s rights.  
There is also the issue of perceived unfairness to defendants, who are bound by 
the class certification determination if they lose but who cannot always take 
advantage of preclusion when they win.  But that unfairness is in many ways 
minimal.  Stare decisis and comity will as a practical measure lead to the same result 
at certification after defendants win, and CAFA now provides defendants in most 
situations an opportunity to avoid the whipsaw of differing state certification 
standards if they choose to do so.147  Perhaps more important, this is an unfairness 
that we are used to as a result of centuries-old preclusion law; the situation is not that 
different than the one faced by defendants on the merits of their claims—multiple 
plaintiffs can bring claims seriatim and the defendant faces the prospect of 
preclusion if it loses while it frequently cannot preclude if it wins.  The individual 
rights model long ago made peace with this result, largely on the premise that, if the 
defendant is ever hoisted, it will be on the petard of a litigation that it itself 
participated in and directed.  Rule 23 breaks no new ground here. 
Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, there is the argument that 
absent class members were “virtually represented” in the proceedings and should be 
bound for that reason.148  The argument has force.  As a practical matter, there is 
little difference between the degree of participation that Mr. Smith had in the federal 
court proceedings to which he was held not a party and the participation of absent 
class members in normal class actions.  Indeed, frequently the entirety of a “class 
action” litigation consists of litigation that occurs before certification, with that event 
coming only at the end of the litigation in connection with court approval of a 
settlement.  If absent class members are deemed adequately represented in this 
context, why not for purposes of the determination made in Smith?  The answer lies 
in the role of the Court.  Rule 23 has at least some measure of legislative legitimacy 
and it is the text of that Rule that identifies the circumstances under which aggregate 
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litigation—and the accompanying damage to individual autonomy in the name of 
societal benefits—will be tolerated.  Because certification was denied, by definition, 
Smith was not such a case.  In the absence of express authorization under Rule 23, 
the Court would not on its own expand the terrain of aggregate litigation by creating 
what amounts to a “common law kind of class action.”149   
This is the enduring point of Smith and the point at which Smith fits nicely into 
the pattern established by the two broader trends with respect to class actions.  The 
“absent” part of the phrase “absent class members” is of concern, and is something 
that is likely to be less true under the new federal brand.  The Court was not at all 
inclined to go in the other direction and expand the circumstances under which 
absence is deemed acceptable.  In short, even where Rule 23 does apply, the Court 
views itself under the federal branding project as having been charged by Congress 
with stepping into the breach to protect and encourage individual participatory rights 
against excessive zeal in the furtherance of the societal interests served by aggregate 
litigation.  Where Rule 23 does not apply, then, as in Smith, the Court will be even 
more protective of those rights.  The Court does not view itself as expanding Rule 23 
and the problems of virtual representation that it creates so as to preempt state 
proceedings or create a federal common law right to aggregate litigation.  Quite to 
the contrary, it views itself as sheparding Rule 23 back into the fold by bringing the 
level of individual participation that occurs in class actions closer to the level that we 
are used to seeing in other litigation.   
E.  Citizen Participation 
The federal brand also has implications for the respective roles of judges and 
litigants.  Outside the class action context, the prevailing metaphor for the judge’s 
role is umpireal.150  The parties are the real players and the judge’s job is impartially 
to enforce the rules which are designed to ensure that neither side receives an unfair 
advantage.  Indeed, in some sense the umpire metaphor overstates the judge’s role 
outside of the class action context.  Unlike the umpire calling balls and strikes, the 
judge has no independent view of the truth of the matter.  The parties choose what 
evidence to develop and what to present to the judge, and the judge’s role is largely 
restricted to choosing between two competing narratives.  As Judge Frankel put it in 
his oft-cited remarks: 
The judge views the case from a peak of Olympian ignorance.  His 
intrusions will in too many cases result from partial or skewed insights.  
He may expose the secrets one side chooses to keep while never 
becoming aware of the other’s.  He runs a good chance of pursuing 
inspirations that better informed counsel have considered, explored, and 
abandoned after fuller study. . . . The ignorance and unpreparedness of the 
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judge are intended axioms of the system.  The “facts” are to be found and 
asserted by the contestants.151 
While Judge Frankel was urging modification of our adversary framework to 
embrace a system more akin to the investigative model of judging prevailing in civil 
law states, he nonetheless took the view that until such change occurred, “within the 
confines of the adversary framework, the trial judge probably serves best as a 
relatively passive moderator.”152  Because it emphasizes the role of the judge in 
ensuring that all parties have a fair chance to participate and de-emphasizes the 
judge’s role in achieving particular substantive outcomes, the umpire metaphor fits 
well with the individual participatory rights view. 
While the umpire metaphor predominates outside the class action context, within 
the field different, more utilitarian, language is sometimes used.  One image 
frequently appearing in public discourse is that of the activist judge who uses Rule 
23 as a means of acquiring for the federal judiciary those powers more traditionally 
thought to be exercised by state governments or the other branches of the federal 
government.  Thus, Rule 23(b)(2) allows for class-wide injunctions and declaratory 
relief that, in some cases, has left federal judges dictating day-to-day decisions in 
schools, prisons, hospitals, or administrative agencies.  Similarly, by certifying a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class, a judge exerts substantial leverage upon a private company to 
settle and, by extension, to alter its future conduct.  In short, whether the institution 
be private or public, whether local, state or federal, whether the province of the 
legislature or the executive, there stands the activist federal judge ready to use Rule 
23 to micromanage the situation.  Put less pejoratively, Rule 23 in this view requires 
the judiciary to play a more active role in furthering the society-wide objectives that 
the underlying substantive law was designed to achieve. 
To the extent that there was divergence between judges’ roles outside the class 
action context and their roles within it, the federal brand pushes for convergence.  
Review of the dockets in the securities realm provides a good example of how this 
has worked in the years following the PSLRA and SLUSA.153  As detailed in Section 
III.A. above, the dockets reviewed consisted of the largest cases with the largest 
recoveries and yet they do not reveal stereotypical judicial activism at work.  Fewer 
than half the cases involved an order on a contested motion for class certification; 
only one defendant moved for summary judgment and awaited an order on the 
motion (and that defendant prevailed);  and there appeared to be only occasional 
efforts to overturn or deeply question the parties’ consensual settlements. 
This does not mean that federal judges were neglectful of securities class action 
cases.  Consistent with the express dictates of the PSLRA, the dockets revealed 
federal judges playing an active role, if not in the substance of the case, in policing 
the process.  Thus, we see judges protecting defendants’ participatory rights by 
playing the PSLRA-envisioned role of gatekeeper.  Rather than permit lawsuits to be 
filed without adequate pre-investigation of the facts in the hopes that discovery 
would later produce support for the allegations made, the PSLRA requires that the 
complaint meet a heightened standard of being supported by particularized evidence 
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and that it do so before any compulsory discovery occur.  In effect this is an effort to 
ensure that the leverage created by Rule 23 and the compulsory discovery provided 
by Rules 26-36 are not themselves the mechanism for creating the claim, but instead 
serve only to facilitate resolution of a claim that pre-exists the application of the 
rules.  The change is consistent with the individual rights vision that the Rules are 
primarily a mechanism for resolution of claims between private parties and not a 
mechanism for creating new claims or resolving some broader societal problem.   
Just as the PSLRA contemplates active efforts by federal judges to protect the 
individual rights of defendants in the way just described, it also implements 
significant changes aimed at protecting the rights of absent class members and other 
plaintiffs.  Thus, rather than permit the first person to the courthouse, or the first 
person to get the attention of a judge, to move forward with litigation that impacts 
the entire class, the PSLRA calls for public notice of the opportunity to be lead 
plaintiff.  There follows an evaluation of the candidates based on statutory factors 
designed to diminish the degree to which the litigation is driven by lawyers and 
ensure that class members have a greater say in the conduct and ultimate resolution 
of the litigation.  The court is then required to select lead plaintiff and lead counsel 
early in the case, before filing of an amended complaint and before any significant 
proceedings have occurred.  This is a change to the frequent practice under Rule 23 
in which class certification—and its attendant evaluation of class representatives and 
class counsel—do not occur until later in the case and, frequently, not until the case 
has in fact settled.  The effects of these changes are twofold:  first, the more orderly 
nature of the proceedings decreases the chances that decisions made by one plaintiff 
will have negative consequences for other class members; second, the formal 
designation of a lead plaintiff and lead counsel early in the litigation creates a legal 
obligation of those entities to represent the interests of absent class members 
throughout the litigation and not just at its conclusion.  Both effects preserve the 
individual rights of absent class members. 
The revised rules of the road require the federal judge to evaluate consolidation 
of all proceedings in one forum, ensure that proper notice of the case has been 
widely circulated, evaluate the conflicting positions as to who should be lead 
plaintiff and lead counsel and make a decision on those questions, and then evaluate 
the amended complaint using a heightened, gatekeeping standard.  In some ways the 
PSLRA places the federal judge in a securities case in the role of a dinner party host 
who determines the invitees and sets the table before the meal begins.  The judge 
provides the order and structure; the litigants do the talking and consuming.  Or, to 
use another metaphor, the PSLRA envisions—and the dockets reviewed confirm—
an umpireal role for the judge in securities class actions. 
The development of a national brand for class actions suggests that the changes 
wrought by the PSLRA in the realm of securities litigation may be translated to class 
action practice more generally and may, indeed, be strengthened even further.  For 
example, Congress and the courts may become more involved in the selection of 
class counsel.  In securities class actions, there must be widespread publication of the 
opportunity to apply to be class counsel, and, following that publication, there are 
specific factors that a court must consider when selecting counsel.  Whether intended 
to or not, this has had the effect of promoting the development of large sophisticated 
plaintiffs firms with expertise in the area of securities litigation.  Rule 23(g) 
identifies a number of similar considerations relating to the appointment of class 
counsel in all class action litigations but the reality is that—without the statutory 
mandate for publication and competition among firms—the inquiry into the 
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adequacy of counsel is all too often prefunctory.  With the federal brand coming into 
being, expect to see heightened scrutiny under Rule 23(g) going forward. 
Hand-in-glove with this is the selection of class representatives.  In the context of 
securities litigation the PSLRA instructs courts to consider a number of factors 
including the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff; the result has been larger 
institutions serving as lead plaintiff.  As compared to individuals, these institutions 
have a greater ability to act as “real” clients influencing decisions made by their 
lawyers.  While the adequacy of particular class representatives is a frequently-
litigated topic outside the securities context, the question put to the court too 
frequently focuses exclusively on the applicability of various defenses to particular 
plaintiffs rather than also focusing on the demonstrated ability of plaintiff to serve as 
an active and engaged participant in making litigation decisions on behalf of the 
class.  This too may change under the federal brand. 
Each of these reforms in the securities context were also accompanied by a 
timing-related reform which, as noted above, has significant impact on the 
participatory rights of the parties.  The decisions as to lead counsel and lead plaintiff 
are made at the very outset of the litigation—even before the consolidated amended 
complaint is filed and, therefore, before any decisions are made about the direction 
of the case.  Rule 23(c) does require that in all class actions “the court must 
determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action” and appoint class 
counsel and class representatives “at an early practicable time” after suit is filed.  On 
its face, this standard is more loose than the PSLRA standard and, in practice, it 
turns out to be substantially more loose with class certification decisions – and 
therefore formal appointment of binding class representatives with attendant duties – 
frequently made late in the case.  The individual rights model suggests that this 
already-existing language in Rule 23 should be honored more scrupulously.   
Then too there is the gatekeeping function that the PSLRA implemented with its 
stay of discovery and heightened pleading standard—each designed to ensure that 
the existence of the Rules of Procedure does not become a mechanism for creating 
litigation over substantive claims where none would have previously existed.  The 
Court’s recent decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal154 and Bell Atlantic v. Twombley155 step 
in the direction of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard and we can probably 
expect to see an increasing tendency by courts to stay discovery pending the 
outcome of an Iqbal/Twombley motion.  This same gatekeeping may apply in the 
class certification decision as well.156 
One can imagine or propose any number of additional specific reforms designed 
to protect individual participatory rights.  The broader point is that the PSLRA paved 
the way for placing federal judges in the class action context more clearly into the 
umpireal role that they frequently play outside the class action context.  As with the 
other two elements of the federal brand that we have discussed—factual specificity 
and protecting informed choice—this element of enhanced citizen participation in 
the litigation reflects a conforming of class action litigation more closely to the 
paradigm that prevails in bi-lateral litigation. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Developing before us is a new national brand of class action litigation dedicated 
to the proposition that all litigants have and should exercise individual participatory 
rights.  The hallmarks of the brand are an emphasis on factual specificity, informed 
choice, and citizen participation.  Certain forms of aggregate proof are out of bounds 
while others require supplementation with more ground-level evidence such as 
testimony from fact witnesses and parties.  Courts are developing and implementing 
procedures to encourage informed participation in litigation decisions by absent class 
members.  In short, the new federal brand is infusing into the class action subarea 
many of the same participatory principles that characterize proceedings in the 
remainder of our judicial system and in the other two branches of our government.  
The result will be better litigation outcomes and a third branch of government that 
respects and protects the individual participatory rights of citizens. 
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